Lebanon: Articles and think tank papers

The Lebanese economic crisis, which began taking shape in October 2019, has been described by the World Bank as one of the top three most severe global crises since 1850. For Lebanon, this downfall has stemmed from a variety of political factors such as the government’s failure to reach an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and their lack of willingness to promote recovery. At its core, the crisis’ link to the political makeup of ruling coalitions makes it such that any solution to it lies in cutting the knots that bind political and economic interests in Lebanon.

The risk of a new war with Israel will derail any fledgling economic recovery for Lebanon as it attempts to convince private-sector investors of its gas and renewable energy potential.

This research study aims to provide new insights into the issue of corruption in Lebanon by examining its impact on various sectors of the country, the role of the government in tackling corruption, and the effectiveness of current anti-corruption measures. Lebanon is ranked 149th out of 180 countries in Transparency International’s 2020 Corruption Perceptions Index, highlighting the widespread nature of the issue. To achieve the research objectives, we adopted a mixed-methods approach that involved both quantitative and qualitative data collection methods.

In Lebanon, the spread of Covid-19 remains relatively limited. In mid-April, the country registered 670 infections and 21 deaths for a population of around 7 million. A success that the Lebanese authorities owe to the imposition of draconian control measures, closing schools and universities, public places, then the land borders and Beirut international airport, before introducing a night-time curfew.

Does religion inevitably promote support for militant politics? Using a new and unique data set compiled from a nationally representative survey in Lebanon, we examine the conditions under which communal religious practice may serve to promote support for or opposition to armed parties. For groups engaged in conflict, communal prayer may increase support for arming political parties. For noncombatant groups, however, religion tends to promote opposition to such militarization.

This Policy Paper presents a menu of reforms that would enable the country to rapidly and significantly turn the page of inaction and decline and return the country to a prosperous and inclusive development path. To that end, reforms are prioritized over two time horizons—the first 100 days of the new Government and the medium term.

Since the Syrian conflict began in 2011, Syrian businessmen have used Lebanon to skirt sanctions and do deals abroad. But Lebanon is no use as a financial hub if its financial sector is frozen. With dollars scarce, the Syrian pound has followed its Lebanese counterpart and crashed to record lows, from 500 to the dollar at the beginning of 2019 to 950 in early December 2019.

Long an immutable fixture of life, the dollar has become an obsession. Lebanon’s currency, the pound, has been pegged at 1,500 to the dollar since 1997. Receipts are printed in both currencies; shopkeepers make change with a mix of dollars and pounds. Officially nothing has changed. But the panic points to a different reality.

Ce dossier de la Revue Internationale de Politique Comparée se propose de déplacer la focale et d’analyser les processus de circulation et de réactivation de réseaux militants entre le Liban et la Syrie à l’aune du conflit depuis 2011. En effet, l’histoire de ces deux pays est intimement liée, mais en tension.

Can official Islamic institutions play a role in preventing violent extremism? Most Arab governments have granted a role to religious institutions in this regard in recent years. Yet, the cases of Lebanon, Morocco and Saudi Arabia exhibit considerable differences. In Lebanon, the role of Sunni religious institution Dar al-Fatwa is limited. Due to the weakness of state capacity and to the external interference in the country, Dar al-Fatwa is hardly able to coordinate Sunni religious activities there.

For the last three decades since the near-simultaneous end of the Cold War and the end of the Lebanese civil war, United States (US) policy towards Lebanon has continued to be dominated by support for specific personalities, parties and officials deemed to be ‘pro-Western’ rather than the construction of strong and effective democratic institutions for the country as a whole. At the same time, successive US administrations have led or encouraged the application of military, financial, judicial and political-diplomatic pressure against Lebanese Hezbollah in an effort to reduce (and at some times eliminate) the party’s military and political standing.

Während sich ab Ende 2010 in seinen Nachbarländern der Reihe nach Massenproteste anbahnten, die zum Teil auch schnell eine gewaltsame Dimension annahmen, blieb es im Libanon verhältnismäßig ruhig. Über das Jahr 2011 hinweg kam es lediglich vereinzelt zu kleineren Protesten, die in ihrem Versuch, auf der Grundlage einer nationalen, konfessionsübergreifenden Kampagne politischen Druck gegenüber der Regierung aufzubauen, eher homogen in Bildungsstand und Herkunft blieben. Zu einer landesweiten und inklusiven Massenmobilisierung sollte es im Libanon erst 2019 kommen.

This paper reviews Lebanon’s ability to manage financial pressures following severe shocks despite its large public debt overhang and significant external vulnerabilities. Based on interviews with market participants in Beirut and London, the paper concludes that Lebanon’s ability to weather what appear to be “perfect storms” derives from three characteristics: a perceived implicit guarantee from donors; Lebanon’s track record of having never defaulted on external debt or deposits; and the unique market structure for Lebanese debt which is dominated by local banks and “dedicated” investors and depositors.

This paper calls for the EU to pursue an approach that supports bottom-up humanitarian and stabilisation efforts. Such a focus will, in time, enable wider reform to take place. By providing support and advocating for the election to take place as promised, the EU would help facilitate the emergence of reform-minded politicians who could challenge and change the system from within.

The Beirut port blast has revealed the fundamental failure of the Lebanese political system, but deep democratic reforms will take time and are fraught with risks. Given the US withdrawal and the extreme tensions in the region, the author argues the EU has a critical role to play in addressing the short-term humanitarian crisis, responding to the economic and financial situation, and providing a forum for civil society empowerment. If it fails to do so, the price is further geopolitical destabilization.

This report presents the results of an ex-post evaluation of the impact of trade chapters of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements with six partners (Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco and Tunisia). The purpose of the evaluation was to assess the achievement of the main objectives of the trade chapters of the Euro-Mediterranean Association Agreements as well as of the supplementary trade-related protocols or agreements complementing the FTAs. Available in English and Arabic.

This report provides qualitative findings from interviews conducted with key stakeholders in Lebanon within the categories of labour, women’s rights, youth, Islamic organizations, rural development, policy-making and new social movements. The report includes background data on the political and economic context in Lebanon, provides an overview of EU policies in Lebanon and presents the research findings from qualitative interviews.

Considering the vital role of local actors, this paper discusses the challenges and opportunities that were identified in the set-up of a municipality-led prevention network in Lebanon. The local prevention in Lebanon is inspired by the Danish prevention model, which around 2014 became internationally known as the "Aarhus model".

While much literature has concentrated on the EU’s policy to return people from within its borders, this article seeks to understand how the EU cooperates with refugee-hosting states beyond its borders, in its ‘Southern Neighbourhood’, to uphold conditions for voluntary, safe and dignified returns. We build on the case of Lebanon, which hosts the highest number of refugees per capita worldwide after receiving more than one million displaced Syrians in the wake of Syria’s 2011 war, and where the EU has made tremendous investments to help build ‘resilience’ in the face of displacement.

With an estimated Syrian refugee population of 1.5 million on top of its 4 million resident nationals, Lebanon claims the highest refugee-per-capita ratio in the world. Today, all political parties in Lebanon agree that the refugees should eventually leave, though they disagree on the conditions that would need to prevail for them to return home.

A wave of nativist ire has left Syrians with nowhere to turn.

Conditions in the Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon are difficult, with poverty rates high, educational attainment low, and opportunities few. Of concern to policy-makers is ‘Ayn al-Hilweh, the largest camp in Lebanon. This camp experiences frequent factional violence and harbors numerous individuals wanted by Lebanese authorities. This study, using a random survey of households, examined the frequency of households’ experience with violence and the association of experiencing violence with PTSD symptomology.

Every third person in Lebanon is a refugee. Many are living in poverty and need legal recognition of their status, as well as access to education and health care. The government is paralyzed, civil society active. Europe is providing considerable financial aid, but achieving little politically.

Every third person in Lebanon is a refugee. Many are living in poverty and need legal recognition of their status, as well as access to education and health care. The government is paralyzed, civil society active. Europe is providing considerable financial aid, but achieving little politically.

The civil war in Syria has caused a mass influx of Syrian refugees into other countries throughout the region and beyond. Jordan has received a large share of Syrian refugees, currently totalling to the alarming number of 1.2 million people. In an effort to better understand the humanitarian, political, economic, sociocultural and environmental challenges to Jordan and its government, this study has developed a comprehensive analytical framework.

This research examines Israel's military actions in Palestine and Lebanon, focusing on their humanitarian, political, and strategic consequences. The ongoing conflict between Israel and Palestine, along with Israel's involvement in Lebanon, has deepened regional instability. Using a mixed-methods approach, including literature reviews, case studies, and interviews with key stakeholders, the study provides a comprehensive analysis of the multifaceted impacts. It highlights the need for immediate international intervention to address humanitarian concerns, foster diplomatic solutions, and ensure accountability for human rights violations. Key recommendations emphasize prioritizing human security and conflict resolution to build a more stable and peaceful future for the region.

The Mediterranean region has become a critical area where security, geopolitics, and energy politics intersect. Recent trends of tensions and cooperation in this region have heightened the significance of the Mediterranean, which is marked by long-standing conflicts with energy-related components. This policy study seeks to enrich the public debate on Mediterranean diplomacy and advance conflict resolution in the region. It addresses several key conflicts in the Mediterranean, which include an energy component and in which progress towards resolution can trigger broader cooperation and inclusivity in the region.

Hezbollah is a holistic network whose social, political, military and cultural dimensions are all parts of a discourse of resistance. Conducting a qualitative frame analysis of speeches by Hezbollah’s General Secretary Nasrallah, supported by interviews with Hezbollah leadership privy to its ideology, this study analyses the construction of muqawama (resistance). It argues that resistance is a complex social phenomenon, which can be manifested, for example, in the differences in how resistance is framed in varying contexts, often addressing different audiences. However, three unifying themes emerged from the frame analysis: diversity of resistance, normalisation of resistance and social dimensions of resistance.

The compromise on offer eight years ago over disputed Mediterranean gas resources can be revived.

Le pays du cèdre et l’Etat hébreu, techniquement en état de guerre, débutent des pourparlers mercredi sur le tracé de leur frontière maritime. Un accord de démarcation pourrait débloquer l’exploration de cette zone, réputée très riche en gaz.

Beirut could tap billions of dollars in natural gas revenue if it can resolve the border dispute.

Lebanese and Israeli officials have for the first time held talks on their disputed maritime border that lies in Mediterranean waters that are potentially rich in natural gas.

Le pays, incapable de subvenir aux besoins énergétiques de sa population, se rêve en acteur du marché des hydrocarbures. Mais un imbroglio avec Israël retarde les explorations offshore.

The Americans' official Geological Survey estimates that from Gaza's coast to southern Turkey the eastern Mediterranean holds a gas amount comparable to the reserves of Iraq. But Lebanon's caretaker government lacks the authority to pass the legislation needed to persuade foreign oil companies to start drilling; a heralded auction is again likely to be delayed. America's effort to mediate over a disputed maritime boundary between Lebanon and Israel is stalling progress.

An old joke--that Moses led his people to the only place in the Middle East without oil--needs updating. Israel may not have oil, but it does have gas. The Tamar gasfield, discovered in 2009 off Israel's coast, holds great promise. The region's political fractiousness, however, does not end at the water's edge. Israel, which relies heavily on imported energy, has much to gain. The gas discovered so far could satisfy its domestic demand for 20 years, according to the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. And exports could yield a fortune.

With potential for huge undersea natural gas yields in the eastern Mediterranean Sea, Lebanon stands poised to reap new energy wealth and to achieve possible energy independence. Despite the promise, Lebanon has yet to drill even an exploratory well in the basin. Blocking the path to energy wealth is a series of external and internal roadblocks. Externally, maritime claims by Israel are hindering Lebanon’s plans to tap offshore gas yields along its boundary. Further, regional dynamics, which range from byzantine relations to outright war, make exploration and pipelines to the European markets uncertain. Internally, Lebanon’s political rivalries have left the country without a president for the past year, blocking forward movement with needed energy legislation.