Polish Presidency: Articles

Was bedeutet eine erfolgreiche Modernisierung der polnischen Streitkräfte für Europa und Deutschland?

The EU’s decision to grant Ukraine and Moldova a candidate country status and the recognition of Georgia’s European perspective in June 2022 has significant effects for both the EU’s enlargement and security and defence policies. So far, ‘hard’ security issues have played little role in the framing of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and the Association Agreements (AAs) with Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia. Their full integration into EU security and defence arrangements will thus require considerable strategy-making and implementation efforts.

From the 2009 sovereign debt crisis to the 2022 Russian full-scale war in Ukraine, the EU has experienced a succession of intersecting crises, or a ‘polycrisis’. This paper examines how this polycrisis has impacted the EU's role in security and defence. While the EU's competences in security and defence have long suffered from disagreements among member states, they have shown notable developments since Brexit, and most importantly, since the 2022 war in Ukraine. It makes a two-step argument to shed light on why the polycrisis has had these differentiated effects over time.

Cooperation between EU member-states in the field of security and defence is increasingly difficult to reconcile with the notion of intergovernmentalism. The decisions to establish the European Defence Fund (EDF), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD) and most recently the European Defence Industry Reinforcement Through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) have resulted in integrative commitments between EU member-states. In order to account for these commitments, we must analyse the positions and perspectives of key (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) EU member-states.

La guerre d’Ukraine a revitalisé l’OTAN, en même temps qu’elle a poussé l’Union européenne à investir au-delà des champs limités occupés par la politique de sécurité et de défense commune depuis le début du siècle. Un nouveau partenariat effectif entre l’Alliance et l’UE est sans doute nécessaire, mais lié à un développement des capacités européennes en utilisant le cadre de l’UE et à une entente directe avec Washington, sans prendre à la lettre l’idée peu crédible d’un « pilier européen de l’Alliance ».

Existing insights into recent defence integration, including against the backdrop of Russia’s war, largely stem from EU governance studies. Although these studies might not explicitly delve into the EU’s politico-strategic role, when combined with the broader framework of International Relations (IR), they imply the EU’s effective progression, at least relatively, as a defence actor. However, a closer analysis of certain key developments and transatlantic dynamics suggests a persistent lack in the political and strategic dimensions of EU defence policy. This disparity arises when IR concepts are tailored to fit the EU context in integration studies.

La guerre en Ukraine a révélé cruellement les lacunes des industries de défense en Europe. L’UE a été directement touchée par la désindustrialisation et par le manque de consolidation d’entreprises trop dispersées face aux mastodontes américains. Il est urgent de procéder à un réarmement industriel capable de combler les lacunes capacitaires et de répondre aux besoins d’une vraie défense de l’Europe.

Over the past 15 years, the EU has gradually become more involved, de jure and de facto, in the field of collective defense. This underappreciated evolution occurred in three phases: first, an initial phase, from the steps leading up to the Lisbon Treaty, which incorporated collective defense into the EU's mandate via Article 42.7 TEU, to the first activation of this provision following the November 2015 Paris attacks; second, a phase of indirect development, with the launch of policies on military mobility and hybrid threats, tangentially linked to collective defense; and third, a phase of direct yet incomplete affirmation, with calls to operationalize Article 42.7 and the signaling of the EU as a collective defense framework during crises with Turkey and Russia.

Why has NATO taken long to adapt its deterrence strategy to Russian revisionism and extend its military presence to the eastern allies? This article traces how the alliance's Enhanced Forward Presence has evolved in Poland and the Baltic states to, in turn, examine the changing understandings of allied deterrence. Abstract Why has NATO taken so long in adapting its deterrence strategy to Russian revisionism and extending its military presence to the eastern allies? The setting up of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Poland and the Baltic states offers a critical case for examining the changing understandings of allied deterrence in the post-post-Cold War era.

Cooperation between EU member-states in the field of security and defence is increasingly difficult to reconcile with the notion of intergovernmentalism. The decisions to establish the European Defence Fund (EDF), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD) and most recently the European Defence Industry Reinforcement Through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) have resulted in integrative commitments between EU member-states. In order to account for these commitments, we must analyse the positions and perspectives of key (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) EU member-states.

This article examines how European Union (EU) arms control measures are tailored to its constitutional foundations. EU Member States subject shipments of arms and components to controls so as to screen them for risks and potentially block them. In this context different Member States may make different geopolitical and humanitarian risk assessments.

Leadership is crucial for the success of a collective actor in reaching common goals. Its relevance is particularly visible in the EU, due to the difficulty in managing and converging a wide range of interests, especially in the intergovernmental field of defence. This article analyses Franco-German transactional leadership throughout the evolution of the EU's security and defence policy, with a focus on the effects of Brexit.

The authors analyse the rhetoric and reality of EU digital sovereignty by looking at content control. The control of online content is central to sovereignty because it relates to fundamental freedoms and democratic competition. They find evidence for a comprehensive but still ongoing trend towards digital sovereignty in policy output and a shift from prioritising free access to the public order in discourse.

This Special Issue (SI) provides a nuanced understanding of the root causes of radicalisation among European youth with both nativist and religious affiliations. The contributions challenge the civilisational paradigm and the reductionist interpretations that often conflate it with extremism, terrorism, and violence.The findings underscore that radicalised youth tend to employ unconventional forms of political expression to articulate their knowledge and garner public attention to their marginalised status. This stems from their lack of trust in political centers, which they perceive as failing to provide remedies for disenfranchised youths experiencing socio-economic, political, spatial, and nostalgic deprivation in the era of globalisation.

This year’s fourth annual Global Summit on Disinformation, like its predecessors, presented a viv-id picture of the ongoing conflict between the purveyors of disinformation and the defenders of responsible journalism. More than its predecessors, however, it posi-tioned that conflict within the context of the challenges to open, democratic society.

Rapid development of artificial intelligence does carry some serious risks, the most important of which is the spread of false and discriminatory information. Since artificial intelligence is "fed" with data from many sources, there is an increased risk that some of the data contains extremist or xenophobic literature. In such circumstances, artificial intelligence could spread extremely dangerous theories and ideas. Thus, government intervention is required to preserve control over the different data categories that developers have access to.

This work proposes a comprehensive research agenda to empirically evaluate the real-world impacts of the European Union’s Digital Services Act (DSA) on combating online disinformation. Coordinated efforts between researchers, regulators and platforms are needed to address methodological challenges around isolating DSA impacts amidst an evolving EU regulatory landscape, constrained data access from platforms, and difficulties generalizing findings across the sociotechnical diversity of platforms and national contexts in EU Member States.

This article investigates how disinformation circulates on social media as adversarial narratives embedded in identity-driven controversies. A definition of disinformation is proposed: Disinformation is an adversarial campaign that weaponizes multiple rhetorical strategies and forms of knowing—including not only falsehoods but also truths, half-truths, and value-laden judgments—to exploit and amplify identity-driven controversies. Finally, the paper has implications for policy makers in handling the spread of disinformation on social media

Disinformation and misinformation have been amplified in the digital age. In order to combat their increasing presence in our everyday lives, we have to first educate ourselves on what disinformation is. In this post, Jakub Ferencik looks at this question in some detail, primarily by analyzing Vladimir Putin’s usage of disinformation in politics. He first demarcates between disinformation and misinformation, points to some examples in Putin’s early tenure as the President of Russia, and compares them with the use of disinformation during the pandemic in order to show why people lose trust in traditional media sources.

In recent years, firms have become increasingly involved in sociopolitical issues via corporate political advocacy (CPA) and corporate social responsibility (CSR) while consumers have become more politically polarized and skeptical of political institutions. Merging these developments, the present work examines similarities and differences in response to CPA and CSR, and the implications for consumer polarization and radicalization. CPA may contribute to polarization and radicalization via negative sentiment expressed through social media and consumer actions. Theoretical contributions, practical implications, and future research directions are detailed.

The paper discusses populist appeals to emotions in political communication, considering their role in the proliferation of political polarisation and radicalisation. Revisiting the Emotional Rescue Model of anger, enthusiasm, and fear, we considered pride and compassion low-arousal alternatives to populist storytelling

Radicals are primarily driven by anger, more than by anxiety, meaning that their information processing is heavily focused on consistency and closure. We discuss that political cynics have become highly effective as a political force, and we offer suggestions for how traditional parties may overcome the “trust crisis” in politics. It is concluded that issue‐position polarization is a phenomenon that operates to an equal extent in moderate voters than in adherents of radical and populist parties. The abyss between moderates and radicals concerns whether or not “to be in the political system” at all.

his thematic issue wants to address this gap in the literature and contribute to developing strategies for mitigating potential threats populism and polarization may pose to liberal democracies. To this end, it examines how populism and polarization affect citizens across Europe. It links research on audiences of hyperpartisan media with work on elite-induced polarization, populist conceptions of democracy, election results and support for the democratic system, and policy-making by populist governments.

Empirical evaluation of accountability in the Single Market confronts many challenges. Two motivate this paper. First, any such evaluation starts by documenting the citizen attitudes to which Single Market governance might or might not be accountable, but that data is scarce. Regular public surveys like Eurobarometer pose few questions about the Single Market or its core issues of market openness. Second, given reasons to expect that even in the most democratic arena, citizens will be less aware and engaged with technical-regulatory issues, what baseline helps us judge an acceptable level of accountability in a complex, continent-wide single market?

A financial services supplier authorised in its home state that wishes to supply services cross-border into another state will, absent any relief, have in addition to meet the regulatory requirements of that host state to trade in it. Regulatory frictions including duplicative regulatory requirements are barriers to cross-border trade. This article considers certain techniques deployed to reduce such barriers, noting that trust plays a part in many of them. These techniques grant relief to incoming firms from obligations to comply with the regulatory requirements of a host state. They may take the form of unilateral arrangements, with or without any conditions. There may be assessments of equivalence as a basis for relief from compliance with the host state’s rules: deference to the home state’s regime, a basis for recognition, whether unilateral or mutual.

Markets require rules, made and enforced by governments, and modern market-making has therefore unfolded as an intrinsic part of state-building. While the European Union is not a state, it has not been immune to these processes. Over the last three decades it has expanded its Single European Market and created a currency while constructing European political authority and deepening its institutional capacities. The EU has done this through supranational market-making largely centred on neoliberal precepts of competition and openness. Today, however, the EU is breaking with that tradition by pursuing a visibly interventionist European industrial policy and geopolitical market strategy.

Against the backdrop of the ever‐increasing importance of digital services, the European Union (EU) is promoting deepening of its digital single market (DSM). Whilst the single market has often been portrayed as the Trojan horse of neoliberalism, recent rhetoric on digital sovereignty indicates a desire for more control over the digital sphere. A historical case study of key elements of the DSM, namely digital services regulation and data protection, shows that EU governance has become less market‐liberal and more public‐interventionist. In response to challenges associated with the digital economy, policy goals have been broadened to include further objectives in addition to competitiveness. Stakeholders and public authorities rather than business actors have become more important in governance processes, and more market‐correcting instruments have been introduced. These reforms have been made by adding more interventionist elements and also by redirecting the role of the European Commission to overseeing very large online platforms.

The nature of global economic interactions is undergoing profound changes. Rising concerns over the security and strategic implications of economic interdependence are leading to what is often defined as a ‘geoeconomic world order’. In framing this Special Issue, this article sets a common conceptual ground to assess whether, how and why the single European market is experiencing such a geoeconomic turn and how EU responses are shaping other international actors in the process. It develops a research agenda to examine (i) the systemic pressures pushing towards geoeconomic responses, (ii) the internal drivers and processes determining the nature of the EU's geoeconomic turn (what we term ‘shades of geopoliticisation’) and (iii) the external consequences of the EU's embrace of geoeconomics.

European integration, which culminated in the completion of the Single Market, the single currency and successive enlargements, is now faced with the question of strategic autonomy. Against this backdrop, the present paper has three objectives. First, it assesses the benefits of EU membership based on new, disaggregated trade and production data and using established and cutting-edge empirical methods. Second, it evaluates the costs of strategic autonomy - implying not trading with "riskier" partners. Third, it asks whether further deepening of the Single Market can alleviate these costs. The paper shows that the gains from European integration are substantial, albeit heterogeneous across Member States and sectors, and that the cost of strategic autonomy can be offset by deeper, but comparatively more modest, integration efforts within the European Single Market.

This paper investigates the performance effects of cross-border business angel investments. Examining 815 investments on a business angel investment platform, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between (geographic and cultural) distance and investment returns. We further show that business angels in large syndicates are less sensitive to the costs of both geographic and cultural distance and earn consistently higher returns. Our study contributes to the literature on business angel internationalization and highlights the role of co-investment networks: network resources allow business angels to mitigate transaction costs associated with cross-border investments and improve their investment returns.

A rule is divisive when its legitimacy is contested and divisive rules are an enduring theme of public administration research. For over three decades, this research has been shaped by red tape theory, which conceptualizes divisive rules as those which consume an organization's resources but fail to advance its goals. Recently, however, the administrative burden framework, which prioritizes the impact of divisive rules on citizens and links their origins to political motives, has grown in popularity. We take stock of the last decade of research on red tape and administrative burden using the meta‐narrative review methodology.

The EU must embrace international cooperation and collaboration in technology-driven industries to ensure competitiveness and global relevance, while also considering the drawbacks of isolationist policies. The EU’s commitment to open markets and global cooperation has historically been its strength, and EU policymakers should continue to prioritise on these principles.

The European Green Deal entails benefits for industrial transition to cleaner production through resource efficiency, paving the way to green transition. We develop a conceptual framework to study the drivers of resource efficiency of European industries towards green growth via segments of the countries' competitiveness under technological heterogeneity. Data on 13 industries in 17 European countries over an 8‐year period is used. Evidence shows that isolated efforts to improve productive performance harms environmental efficiency in low competitiveness countries. Results show that industrial environmental performance is affected by country's competitiveness, contributing to the implementation of the New Industrial Strategy of Europe.

This study aims to examine how the adoption of digital technologies affects the business competitiveness of countries in Latin American and European countries. Using GCI data, the authors present empirical evidence on the predictors of competitiveness across 17 Latin American and 28 European countries with a special focus on the adoption of digital technologies.

The need for ‘more Europe’ stands out today in an international environment that is contaminated by populism, authoritarianism and demagogy. Consequently, when confronting political radicalism, the domains that the EU should henceforth concentrate on in a positive way must be specified, explaining practically and with pragmatism the reasons for ‘more Europe’. In particular, the EU must deliver concrete benefits that citizens can see in their daily lives, but, at the same time, it has to give them more democratic control over their representation in EU bodies and in the way EU law is shaped and implemented. To accept such progress, the EU must first recognise the critical flaws in its current economic and political architecture, before proceeding to adopt policies that will adequately restore the dynamism of the European dream, leading to a more efficient and just EU. More democracy will help gather support, and ensure renewed progress towards a closer Union in which the single market is meaningfully deepened.

The supply of entrepreneurial finance in Europe is constrained by the geographical fragmentation of its capital market. The need to facilitate more cross-border investing by business angels - the main source of early stage finance - is recognized. A study of business angels on the island of Ireland identifies three constraints on cross-border investing: (1) lack of information on cross-border investment opportunities; (2) the preference of angels to invest locally; and (3) tax incentives that are only available for investments in the angel's own country. Increasing cross-border investment requires mechanisms that build relationships between business angels in different countries.

The implications of red‐tape barriers (RTBs) under lobbying pressures differ markedly from those of traditional trade barriers. RTBs affect the extensive margin of trade and may respond in opposite ways to reductions in tariffs versus reductions in natural trade costs: The former induce a protectionist backlash that may reduce trade both at the intensive and extensive margin, whereas the latter may induce a reduction in RTBs magnifying the direct trade‐increasing effects. Furthermore, if tariff commitments are optimized, the availability of RTBs limits the extent of tariff liberalization, and political uncertainty tends to increase the prevalence of RTBs.

The European Single Market created a common market for millions of Europeans. However, 30 years after its introduction, it appears that the benefits of the common European project are occasionally being questioned at least by some parts of the population. Others, by contrast, strive for deeper integration. Against this background, we empirically gauge the growth effect that arose from the Single Market. Using the synthetic control method, we establish the growth premium for the Single Market overall and for its founding members. Broadly in line with the predictions made by Richard Baldwin at the onset of the Single Market project, we find significantly higher real GDP per capita for the overall Single Market area of around 12–22 %. In comparison, smaller EU Member States seem to have benefited somewhat more compared to larger countries. The estimated growth effects underline the case for further deepening and broadening the Single Market where possible.

Despite emigrations' adverse impacts on several EU Member States, especially in Central Eastern Europe, topics like brain drain and depopulation have received relatively little attention at EU level compared to concerns associated with free movement and immigration. This article offers an answer to why this is so. Drawing on agenda-setting theory, it argues that the institutional framework of the EU both inhibits and disincentivises attempts to turn emigration into an EU level topic. Seen through the lens of the EU policy, regulating emigration becomes a matter of cohesion policy, which makes it both difficult and unattractive to lobby. To assess the argument empirically, the article draws on elite interviews with national and EU policymakers and document analysis from 2010 to 2023.

In the wake of the 2015 Migration Crisis, the European Union has embarked on an extensive process to reinforce external border controls and make horizontal cooperation between EU agencies critical. This article leverages the principal-agent model to elucidate the impact of inter-agency cooperation on agency autonomy and, by extension, the management of the EU's external borders. The findings reveal that inter-agency cooperation leads to a situation in which the participating agencies enjoy more room for manoeuvre than originally granted by the EU legislature.

The recent Pact on Migration and Asylum, a package of legislative and policy reforms to the European Union (EU) asylum acquis, introduces the concept of expedited procedures for asylum seekers likely to be in need of international protection. These procedures can be implemented under the new Crisis Regulation, which can be triggered in situations of crisis and force majeure. Generally, the Crisis Regulation foresees a range of problematic derogations from the EU asylum system, while the potential use of expedited procedures presents more protective options for granting asylum in crisis and force majeure situations. This article explores the possibility of implementing prima facie or manifestly well-founded procedures under the new Crisis Regulation, arguing for creative, flexible and scaled-up use of expedited procedures, drawing on international practice, to provide fast, fair and efficient procedures to recognise the status of refugees entering the EU in times of crisis.

This article examines the links between sustainability and migration in EU law and policy and suggests that sustainable migration should be perceived as a political concept that was central for EU migration politics following the so-called migration crisis. Sustainable migration is a powerful tool at the hands of the Commission and has been used to forge consensus between Member States that might profoundly disagree on the future of EU migration. At the same time, the concept offers little guidance in terms of legal obligations for the protection of migrants.

La fortification des frontières de l’Europe est intrinsèquement liée à l’usage croissant des technologies numériques. Passeports biométriques, portiques automatisés, drones, capteurs, systèmes de détection placés aux frontières, etc., ces dispositifs facilitent l’identification des individus, et donc le contrôle des personnes étrangères qui cherchent à entrer dans l’Union européenne (UE). Des investissements publics faramineux sont alloués à la conception et au déploiement de ces outils, malgré leur caractère liberticide. À moins d’une opposition publique significative, il est probable qu’à l’avenir, l’UE investisse encore davantage dans ce domaine.

À l’approche des élections européennes de juin 2024, ce thème de prédilection des extrêmes droites, en France comme dans bien d’autres pays européens, est régulièrement mis en avant et souvent instrumentalisé au mépris des réalités sociales et statistiques. Or, comme le rappelle ici Catherine Wihtol de Wenden, spécialiste du sujet, les flux migratoires sont un phénomène inhérent aux sociétés mondialisées qui ne pourra être gommé d’une manière ou d’une autre. Elle montre, dans cet article, comment ont évolué les migrations au fil du temps et combien elles sont nettement plus régionalisées qu’intercontinentales. Elle précise également les facteurs structurels qui motivent les migrations en pointant un certain nombre d’idées reçues en la matière, ainsi que les tendances amenées à perdurer (démographie, crises…). Enfin, elle examine le cas spécifique des flux entre l’Europe et les régions méditerranéennes.

Depuis longtemps, les sciences sociales se sont emparées de l’amalgame qui est fait sur le plan politique entre migration, sécurité et guerre. Cette contribution aborde le contrôle migratoire sous l’angle du militarisme, ici entendu comme la tendance à réduire les questions sociale et politique à une dimension militaire. Une telle analyse paraît fructueuse pour penser la dépolitisation de plus en plus marquée, l’érosion des normes de protection internationale et la déshumanisation croissante des enjeux migratoires.

The hard-right Law and Justice party that governed Poland in 2015-23 railed against non-European immigration. [...]in practice it quintupled the number of work permits issued to Asians and Latin Americans, to 275,000 in 2023. A proposal in August by Thierry Aartsen, an MP from the Liberals (another coalition partner), would subsidise farms that use robots.

This paper will explore the external aspects of the European Union’s New Pact on Migration and Asylum. It will consider the EU’s external approach to migration management by looking at the progress made by the EU Institutions, EU agencies and Member States since the EUCO meeting in February 2023 and will examine in particular the activities and positions of some Member States which are driving the external approach to migration policy.

Ce qui cimente les pays de l’Union, c’est le partage « équitable » du fardeau de la gestion de ces migrants, en passant des accords avec des pays prêts à gagner de l’argent pour ce gardiennage. S’agit-il de réarmer la colonialité ? Il faut rajouter une étoile noire au drapeau européen.

This article argues that states’ sovereign powers in the realm of control of non-EU migration have been largely undiluted by the development of the international system of human rights protection. It shows how the 2015 migration crisis galvanized multilateral international co-operation on the part of the EU and its member states in the field of non-EU migration in a way that entrenched EU states’ sovereign self-interest by institutionalizing a soft-law approach, thereby producing a crisis from the perspective of migrants’ rights protection. I also argues h that the migration crisis facilitated a resurgence of state sovereignty in the EU to the detriment not only of migrants’ rights, but also of internal EU co-operation and co-ordination.

Periods of forced migration to and in Europe have been common in the past decade and show no expectation of stalling due to ongoing armed conflicts, global inequalities and the adverse effects of climate change. Nevertheless, the provision of accommodation for asylum seekers and refugees continues to depend on temporary, ad hoc solutions.

En 2022, l’immigration a atteint des records en Europe, rappelant la crise migratoire de 2015. Ce sujet est instrumentalisé par les partis populistes et contribue à la polarisation des sociétés. De plus en plus de responsables politiques accusent le droit d’être trop protecteur des personnes migrantes. Les juges iraient ainsi à l’encontre de la volonté populaire. Les travaux de recherche sont bien moins alarmistes, et mériteraient d’être davantage pris en compte par les décideurs publics.

Pressures to comply with EU rules have allegedly eroded opportunities for national governments to adopt policies that they support. Conversely, research into differentiated implementation underlines that governments use their discretion to tailor supranational policies to national contexts. This study addresses these competing arguments using unique data on the implementation of EU migration issues.

The Eastern enlargements of the EU increased the bloc’s dependency on Russian gas and contributed to a more cautious attitude towards these supplies. This paper assesses the Russian gas dependency of the 11 Central and East European new member states according to the ambition and execution of their national energy strategies and compares it to the gas dependency shifts in the old member states.

This paper analyzes cybersecurity as a legal institution, gives its detailed theoretical and legal characteristics. The purpose of this study is to analyze the legal acts, and in particular the criminal law, in order to summarize the existing regulations related to the means of ensuring cybersecurity in the European Union (EU), the study of this institution, both in general and in relation to individual industries, first of all, to the fuel and energy complex.

The different ways in which European Union member-state governments add levies to the price of electricity creates huge discrepancies in the prices paid by consumers. Europe’s energy transition depends upon increasing electrification of the economy and increasing the share of that electricity produced by renewable sources. Both factors raise the importance of electricity taxes set by governments. The energy crisis drew attention to this: as electricity prices soared, governments responded with billions of euros in subsidies to protect households and companies. While the acute phase of the energy crisis has passed, growing concerns about industrial competitiveness create political pressure for governments to continue with such subsidies or tax exemptions.

The ongoing shift in the geopolitical landscape presses the EU to recognise its limits on energy security approach and governance. Our new study written by Dr Jacopo Maria Pepe from the German Institute for Security and Political Affairs (SWP) provides an explanation of the key challenges and outlines recommendations on how to build a united European energy front towards a functional energy security strategy.

Critical Infrastructures (CIs) are the backbone of our societal and economic activities. Safeguarding their uninterrupted operation and keeping them safe against different types of threats, from natural disasters to human-induced acts, is of the essence. This analysis focuses on the energy sector mostly and the water sector secondarily as these two sectors are among the CIs that have mainly suffered the consequences of cyber incidents. In this context, the paper examines the applicability of the EU cybersecurity regulatory framework in the energy (including both electricity and gas) and the water sectors, as well as the sector specific initiatives that have been adopted so far to tackle the cybersecurity challenges the two sectors face.

Europeans made remarkable progress in removing Russian gas from their energy mix in 2022. But 2023 brings with it a whole host of new challenges.

The EU has been engulfed in a serious gas (and energy) crisis since late 2021, caused by 'a perfect storm’ of various factors negatively affecting global gas supply and demand fundamentals – including a sharp reduction of Russian gas supplies. The crisis has led to sharply increased (and volatile) gas prices but not (yet) physical shortages of gas. While the EU has made a political decision to eliminate its dependence on Russian gas ‘well before 2030’, it is not in control of either the scale or the timing of this process. Helped by anomalously warm temperatures to date, the EU appears increasingly likely to get through the current winter relatively unscathed. Next winter however could be significantly more challenging if Russian gas supplies were to decrease further or stop altogether, especially if accompanied by rising China LNG demand, interruptions of other supplies, and cold winter temperatures.

The Russian aggression against Ukraine brought energy security to the top of the European policy agenda. Existing literature suggests that the prioritization of energy security would come at the expense of climate policy. We argue that the EU's response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine may constitute a departure from this pattern. Our assessment shows a higher level of coherence of objectives and instruments between energy security and climate objectives than the EU's energy policy responses to previous crises with Russia, notably the gas supply crisis of 2009 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014. While some uncertainty about final outcomes remains, we argue that change in several contextual conditions helps explain coherent policy outputs and make coherent outcomes more likely on the occasion of the present crisis.

Russia’s war in Ukraine, and the brutal decoupling from Russian fossil fuels, is a game changer for the Central and Eastern Europe region which was still heavily dependent on Russia for its energy supply.

The recent record-high gas prices have triggered legitimate concerns regarding the EU’s energy security, especially with dependence on natural gas from Russia. This brief discusses the historical and current risks associated with Russian gas imports. We argue that decreasing the reliance on Russian gas may not be feasible in the short-to-mid-run, especially with the EU’s goals of green transition and the electrification of the economy. To ensure the security of natural gas supply from Russia, the EU has to adopt the (long-proclaimed) coordinated energy policy strategy.

There are three main axes in the EU response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. The first axis included the imposition of sanctions on Russia. The second axis related to the provision of economic and defensive support to Ukraine to help it repel the invaders. And the third axis sought to address energy, and by extension the economic crisis brought about among EU member states by the invasion itself, by the broader geo-economic disruption it has caused, and by the consequences of the sanctions imposed on Russia. The European Union demonstrated rapid reflexes in relation to the first axis. It was also very quick to react when it came to providing economic and defence support to Ukraine. But it has been disappointingly slow in activating the third axis.

Market turmoil and geopolitical realignment after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine put livelihoods and the green-energy transition at risk. Here’s how researchers can help overcome the threats.

The Russian-Ukrainian dispute over the natural gas transit and the subsequent disruptions in natural gas supply to some countries in South-East Europe (SEE) in 2006 and 2009 attracted considerable public and academic attention and it wouldn’t be overstated to say that they have changed the direction of the entire energy policy of the European Union. Sixteen years after the first gas crisis, in light of the current energy crises and the military conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, this paper attempts to illustrate the trends in the natural gas sector development in South-East Europe, to evaluate whether and how the role of the Russian natural gas supplies in the region’s energy security has changed and to examine what measures have been taken for the security of natural gas supplies in the region over the years.

The author analyses the impact of the Ukraine crisis. According to this article, the crisis will accelerate a shift to non-fossil-fuel energy sources

The energy transition coincides in time with a profound socio-technological and geopolitical change. The pandemic crisis has been an eye-opener as it has been accompanied by an energy crisis. According to the author, whether the transformation to cleaner energy will lead to more secure energy markets, the road leading there is fraught with uncertainty.

A Sustainable Food System needs to be implemented through a legal framework balancing measures concerning all the aspects of sustainability (the social, economic and environmental ones), as defined by the Farm to Fork strategy. Since environmental issues are considered a structural part of CAP regulations, a special attention shall be paid both to social and economic sustainability of agricultural and food system, as fundamental pillars for a resilient and competitive development of the primary sector. These aspects, which make up a “social sustainability model” in the agri-food chain are strongly linked together and require a comprehensive policy regulation. This policy perspective includes a new perception of entrepreneurs and workers employed in rural areas intended for the production of food and related to the environmental protection.

This report investigates the potential effects of 12 free trade agreements (FTAs) under the current EU trade agenda. For this, it quantifies the cumulated sectoral impacts in terms of bilateral trade, production, demand, and price developments. Moreover, it provides insights on the evolution of supply, demand, and farm-gate prices for the most relevant EU agricultural commodity markets. In contrast to a forecast exercise, this analysis compares two variants of a trade liberalisation scenario (conservative and ambitious) to a business-as-usual (baseline) situation in 2030. The study confirms that the analysed free trade agreements have the potential to benefit the EU agri-food sector when considered simultaneously. It also highlights the vulnerability of the beef, sheep meat, poultry, sugar, and rice sectors.

EU pre-accession economies, including Albania, Kosovo and North Macedonia, rely heavily on agriculture that is a key employer in rural areas. The main challenges in the agriculture sector remain low productivity, lack of infrastructure, and poor access to finance and markets. EU membership aspirations and the pursuit of European Green Deal (EGD) guidelines provide a yardstick to assess regional agricultural policies, emphasizing sustainable practices and organic farming. The need for balanced increase in production and demand, improved supply chains, and compliance with EU standards is evident

Cattle are directly responsible for half of the greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions from EU agriculture, once enteric fermentation and manure management are taken into account. Faced with the need to achieve a rapid curbing of GHG, voices in some EU circles have been calling for reducing the size of cattle herds, a radical option whose impact has not even been roughly estimated.

Reducing greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture is crucial to reach global and regional climate targets. However, the efficiency of unilateral climate policies aimed at taxing emissions might be hampered by carbon leakage. One way to eliminate leakage is to implement a global carbon tax. In this article, the authors study the effects of a carbon tax in agriculture on GHG emissions by simulating five policy scenarios using the CAPRI model; (i) an EU tax, (ii) an EU tax complemented with a border carbon adjustment mechanism (BCA), (iii) a global tax, (iv) a global tax scaled by GDP per capita, and (v) a low global tax at 1/10 of the tax level in the other scenarios.

This article draws from economic theory and the recent European Commission report on agricultural land market regulation to assess the suitability of selected regulatory policies for agricultural land markets in Ireland. Insights from policy in other EU Member States indicates that some flexibility is always required to permit the existence of temporary land leasing contracts.

This article provides a doctrinal legal analysis of the ‘social conditionality’ mechanism introduced in the latest reform of the EU's Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Building on that analysis, the article proceeds to assess the likelihood of social conditionality improving the conditions of agricultural workers in the EU, thereby achieving the objectives set out for it by the EU legislator.

Dans le cadre du Green Deal , vaste plan de transformation des modes de production, de consommation et de vie de l’Union européenne (UE) destiné à réduire l’impact des activités humaines sur les ressources naturelles, l’environnement et les écosystèmes, la stratégie « De la ferme à la fourchette » ( From Farm to Fork , F2F) dévoilée en 2022 par la Commission européenne vise à réduire drastiquement l’empreinte environnementale du secteur agroalimentaire européen, à fournir aux consommateurs une nourriture plus saine et abordable, et à rendre les pratiques agricoles plus soutenables, tout en assurant la souveraineté alimentaire de l’UE.

This article considers EU and global developments that have affected the availability and affordability of food in the EU and explores the implications for farmers and consumers. Recent and imminent policy changes that may further affect food security, farm incomes and the future of rural areas are also reviewed. The key message is that all policy choices present a trade-off, and this is particularly evident when the sometimes competing goals of food security and sustainability are considered.

Cet article éclaire le champ de recherche de la méthanisation agricole en interrogeant la tension qui ressort entre le répertoire de la transition énergétique et celui de la transition écologique lorsqu’on examine la territorialisation des acteurs et des processus, et non simplement la production d’énergie renouvelable. L’analyse repose sur une approche bibliométrique à partir des travaux publiés en français et en anglais – en mobilisant le logiciel libre IRaMuTeQ –, couplée à la lecture qualitative de ces articles. Loin de tout regard unique, la problématique sociétale de la méthanisation agricole s’analyse à la jonction des deux registres du projet – la territorialisation de l’enjeu se marque à la fois spatialement et par rapport à une pluralité d’acteurs en interaction – et de la production énergétique (qui s’appréhende en lien à une conformation d’opportunités et de contraintes sociales, économiques et réglementaires)

is article explores the question of whether and in which ways the regulatory approach advanced in SFS chapters in recent EU trade agreements reflects the holistic approach of the SFS framework. It argues that although SFS chapters cover a broad range of policy issues, they do not address the key issues of food security and demand-side interventions. Further, SFS chapters currently primarily serve to establish commitments to regulatory cooperation, missing out on the chance to introduce more direct measures to steer trade in food to become more sustainable.

This article exploits the sequences of the European Union (EU) enlargements to investigate their impact on the incoming countries' agricultural policy. The results suggest that earlier 1973 and 1985 EU enlargements show a significant increase in the rate of assistance to agriculture of incoming countries. The opposite holds, however, for the 1995 and 2004 enlargements, where the incomers significantly reduced their level of assistance to agriculture, in comparison with a counterfactual scenario.

L’agriculture et l’alimentation ne servent pas qu’à remplir nos assiettes, ces deux activités ont une dimension profondément géopolitique. Alors que le monde a traversé une pandémie mondiale et vit encore les effets d’une guerre qui a notamment bousculé les marchés alimentaires, la peur de manquer et la perte de confiance dans une mondialisation qui a montré ses limites réhabilitent le concept de souveraineté alimentaire. Jusqu’où résisteront les rêves d’autosuffisance dans un monde aux ressources naturelles finies et aux modèles agricoles souvent à bout de souffle?

The war in Ukraine has sharpened the debate about the future of agriculture in the EU. The revision of targets and the timetable of the green transition is advocated by big producers while environmentalists urge its speed up. In the face of political and economic instability, the majority of Member States are reducing their ambitions for environment-friendly reforms of the agricultural sector.

The purpose of this review is to identify how health professionals perceive participation in implementation of new technology in healthcare organizations. A total of 15 articles were included in the review, four themes describing how participation of health professionals in digital transformation affects the outcomes were identified, and three themes describing the factors that are necessary to promote participation.

L’article se propose de présenter les objectifs, le positionnement et les moyens de cette nouvelle agence de santé l’HERA qui complète le dispositif des agences européennes de santé, sur leurs interactions dans un monde en évolution engagé dans la démarche « One health ».

Responding to the health need of refugees and migrants is key to accommodate universal health coverage, health security and health promotion to guarantee the well-being and protection of populations. This is in line with the human rights agenda as well as with the adoption of a coherent efficient comprehensive health system.

The apparent failure of global health security to prevent or prepare for the COVID-19 pandemic has highlighted the need for closer cooperation between human, animal (domestic and wildlife), and environmental health sectors. This paper explores four challenges: first, the sectoral, professional, and institutional silos and tensions existing between human, animal, and environmental health; second, the challenge that the international legal system, state sovereignty, and existing legal instruments pose for the governance of One Health; third, the power dynamics and asymmetry in power between countries represented in multilateral institutions and their impact on priority setting; and finally, the current financing mechanisms that predominantly focus on response to crises, and the chronic underinvestment for epidemic and emergency prevention, mitigation, and preparedness activities.

This article investigates how organizations embedded in a supply system collectively respond to risks and seize opportunities arising from crisis events under shifting forms of uncertainty. Using the United Kingdom (UK) medicine supply system as the research context, it explore how decision-makers navigated the effects of an event with knowable implications (UK's European Union exit, 2016–2020) followed by an event with unknowable implications (COVID-19 global pandemic, 2020–2021).

The healthcare supply chain ensures that critical medical supplies and equipment are available to treat patients during health emergencies such as pandemics and bioterrorism attacks. However, the most recent events of COVID-19 put this system to a test. They found it full of vulnerabilities, leaving gaps in such critical supplies as personal protective equipment, ventilators, and diagnostics. This has very serious consequences for patient care and public health outcomes. It follows that there is a need to carry out comprehensive research to assess the resiliency of the current healthcare supply chain model in developing evidence-based strategies to increase the ability to resist and recover rapidly from major disturbances.