The Europe of Defence: Articles

Scholarship and policy documents largely explain the use of private military and security companies (PMSCs) in the European Union's (EU) Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions based on cost-savings and lack of in-house resources by member states (MSs). In this article, we develop a more comprehensive explanation of the EU's increasing use of PMSCs in CSDP missions as the outcome of three overlapping gaps: those between capabilities and expectations, consensus and expectations, as well as intentions and implementation.

In an effort to adjust to the new strategic reality, the EU is trying to make it easier for member-states to strengthen Europe’s defences. Success or failure depends on them.

This policy brief starts by setting out why UK-EU co-operation is a key building bloc of a stronger European security posture. It then takes stock of the reasons for the current lack of UK-EU defence co-operation, its risks and missed opportunities. Finally, it makes recommendations on how the EU and the UK should deepen co-operation.

The re-election of Donald Trump as US president poses an unprecedented security challenge for Europe, which has been dependent on NATO for its security. This article proposes that Europe could take ownership of its own defence by reviving the European Defence Community (EDC), an organisation established in 1952 by the six founding member states of the European Union to shield Europe from the Russian threat. The EDC was formalised in a treaty that was ratified by four countries in 1953-54. Therefore, it would be legally possible for the EDC to enter into force today with the ratification of the two missing member states (Italy and France). This method of strengthening defence integration in Europe would be superior to all existing alternatives, not least because it would be easier to pursue.

Europeans need to bolster their security. Even if the conflict in Ukraine were to end soon, the threat to European security from Russia would remain. Europe’s southern neighbourhood is a source of threats, both from state and non-state actors. And in Donald Trump’s second term, America is likely to devote fewer resources to defending its European allies – even if Trump’s transactional rhetoric towards Europe suggests it is unlikely to abandon them entirely.

Donald Trump's re‐election as President of the United States and Russia's aggression of Ukraine pose unprecedented challenges to transatlantic relations and European security. The EU as it is is unprepared to take care of its defence. This article explores how the law can be activated creatively to achieve defence integration in Europe and proposes to revive the 1952 European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty. Specifically, the article claims that, in strictly legal terms, the EDC can be brought into operation today—simply with the ratification by two states: France and Italy—and provides comprehensive arguments from public international law, comparative law and domestic constitutional law to make the point.

Two and a half years after Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the war is at an impasse and the EU finds itself at the heart of a territory under serious threat yet lacking genuine military and defence autonomy and reliant on protection by the Atlantic Alliance and the USA. As this situation persists and the peaceful interlude of the last half century rapidly draws to a close, the EU is becoming increasingly vulnerable. In this context, Jean-François Drevet points, in this Chronicle, to three particularly worrying elements: the risk of a European diplomatic defeat, the reality of the guarantees for protecting the continent which NATO is supposed to provide, and the EU's budgetary shortfall in terms of defence spending.
Article in French

It has been seven decades since the six founding member states of what would become the European Union (EU) sought to integrate their armies into a common defence force through the European Defence Community. Today, while ever more European decision makers allude to the need to create such a force, it remains a distant prospect. What is it that is really hampering progress towards a common European defence model based on a shared army? What is the position of the main EU actors – society, political parties and institutions – on the subject? Using a variety of methodological approaches, this paper seeks to provide empirical evidence of the social, political party and institutional complexities hindering its realisation. Although the EU is not currently working on the creation of a common, single army, events such as the invasion of Ukraine could put it on the political agenda, and neither society, nor the elites, nor the major parties would be opposed.
The full text articles of this issue are available only in Spanish language.

Donald Trump's re‐election as President of the United States and Russia's aggression of Ukraine pose unprecedented challenges to transatlantic relations and European security. The EU as it is is unprepared to take care of its defence. This article explores how the law can be activated creatively to achieve defence integration in Europe and proposes to revive the 1952 European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty. Specifically, the article claims that, in strictly legal terms, the EDC can be brought into operation today—simply with the ratification by two states: France and Italy—and provides comprehensive arguments from public international law, comparative law and domestic constitutional law to make the point. Needless to say, legal feasibility does not equate with political feasibility, and the article mentions several of the obstacles and challenges along this path. Yet, shedding light the EDC has two advantages.

While the EU's competences in security and defence have long suffered from disagreements among member states, they have shown notable developments since Brexit, and most importantly, since the 2022 war in Ukraine. We make a two-step argument to shed light on why the polycrisis has had these differentiated effects over time. The first move we make is to unpack the polycrisis to explain why and when an increase in competences may take place. We single out two crises that offer pathways for positive politicisation, leading to increased cooperation and competences: an external military threat and an internal crisis in the form of the loss of a major veto player. In a second step, we argue that the existence of an alternative organisation, NATO, helps us explain where and what cooperation can take place. Shared military threats can lead to complementary rather than substitutive empowerment at least during the duration of the crisis.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine has exposed divisions in European strategic culture and threat perception. The search for a lowest-common-denominator response to the threat has hampered the European reply to the Russian aggression. Notwithstanding the importance of keeping a broad coalition together, this article argues that it is now time to create a vanguard of like-minded European nations, led by France, Poland and, though not an EU member, the UK, but open to other states, which can force the creation of a new strategic culture able to meet the Russian threat. This ‘Beowulf Group’, named after the Danish hero from the Anglo-Saxon epic who stood up to the marauding monster Grendel, could establish a Strategic College for Europe, a joint Elite European Reserve Legion and a strategic communications centre, to move European policy in a more active direction.

The European Defence Union, a 70-year-old idea that has never been realised, can finally be built if Europeans close the existing defence capability gaps between themselves and the US. This publication proposes the creation of a fully capable European Defence Union through a structured, step-by-step process of strengthening essential building blocks ('defence pyramid'). It aims to prepare the Union to respond to growing security threats and instability in its neighbourhood, in complementarity with NATO.

Russia’s large-scale aggression against Ukraine brought back the debate about the European Union’s strategic autonomy ambitions in security and defence. The notion had slipped off the EU’s radar following the post-2016 thematic shift in strategic autonomy discussions to global economic interdependencies. Our article contributes to an appraisal of the strategic autonomy debate in security and defence since Russia’s full invasion of Ukraine, while also tracing the emergence and revival of the concept over the past 25 years. By unpacking the EU’s quest for strategic autonomy as a process of maturation since the late 1990s, we examine the extent to which the EU has grown into an autonomous security and defence actor. We further discuss the implications of maturation for EU security and defence policy. Drawing on 20 semi-structured interviews with policymakers and foreign policy experts in seven member states, our study brings the underexplored aspect of national acceptability of EU external action to the fore. We show that significant progress has been made regarding both ideational and material aspects of EU security and defence policy.

Le 1er octobre, l’ancien Premier ministre néerlandais, Mark Rutte, prend la relève du Norvégien Jens Stoltenberg au poste de Secrétaire général de l’OTAN. Connu pour sa longévité politique et ses positions fermes à l’égard du Kremlin, Mark Rutte devra poursuivre les grands chantiers de l’organisation : soutien à l’Ukraine, nouveaux membres, budgets des Européens, pour ne citer que ces exemples. Certes, les Etats-Unis sont de plus en plus tournés vers les tensions de l’Asie et la région Indopacifique, mais les priorités de l’OTAN restent très européennes. Avec la guerre -de haute intensité-- en Ukraine, la construction d’une défense européenne n’avait pas reçu tant d’attention et d’efforts depuis le projet de Communauté européenne de Défense (CED) dans les années 1950

Ad hoc forms of military cooperation have become commonplace in European security and defence. The EU has even voiced the ambition to strengthen mutual support between its CSDP operations and European-led ad hoc coalitions. We ask whether and how this mutual support is strengthened and what it means for European defence integration. We focus on two cases: Task Force Takuba deployed to the Sahel region and the European Maritime Awareness mission in the Strait of Hormuz. Our analysis shows that European-led ad hoc coalitions are driven by short-term pragmatism, focused on providing quick fixes to collective problems and achieving particularistic gains.

Cooperation between EU member-states in the field of security and defence is increasingly difficult to reconcile with the notion of intergovernmentalism. The decisions to establish the European Defence Fund (EDF), Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), the Coordinated Annual Review of Defence (CARD) and most recently the European Defence Industry Reinforcement Through Common Procurement Act (EDIRPA) have resulted in integrative commitments between EU member-states. In order to account for these commitments, we must analyse the positions and perspectives of key (France, Germany, Italy, and Spain) EU member-states. The article adds to the literature on European integration in two respects. First, by developing indicators to identify and establish the extent to which a move beyond intergovernmentalism has taken place. Second, through the application of a comprehensive approach, which is required in order to understand why EU security and defence integration has come about.

This essay examines the historically anomalous nature of the contemporary US-led European security order in the context of other distinctive aspects of European history. These include the absence of a long-lasting hegemon since the fall of the Roman Empire, Europe's rise and global dominance, and its instigation of the two world wars which brought its own destruction. The essay argues that America's role as effectively a non-territorial hegemon allowed Europe largely to reconcile the 'impossible trinity' of unity, security and liberty which had previously eluded it. However, this anomalous and relatively happy period could soon end if, due to US internal political dynamics or a need to strategically prioritise East Asia, the American Leviathan withdraws from its function as Europe's security provider.

Existing insights into recent defence integration, including against the backdrop of Russia’s war, largely stem from EU governance studies. Although these studies might not explicitly delve into the EU’s politico-strategic role, when combined with the broader framework of International Relations (IR), they imply the EU’s effective progression, at least relatively, as a defence actor. However, a closer analysis of certain key developments and transatlantic dynamics suggests a persistent lack in the political and strategic dimensions of EU defence policy. This disparity arises when IR concepts are tailored to fit the EU context in integration studies.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shaken up the EU approach to defence matters. Funds have been released to help in providing Ukraine with ammunition. More interesting, the European Defence Agency (EDA) has taken up a more active role in the procurement of defence materials.
While these developments are still limited, a partial centralisation of defence procurement at EU level seems to be in the cards.

Russia's war on Ukraine has upended the European security order. Ukraine has requested EU membership, unprecedented sanctions have been imposed on Russia, European countries have shipped weapons and munitions to Ukraine and NATO has shored up its military presence. Despite such action, is it possible to speak of a transformative moment or 'Zeitenwende' for EU security and defence? This article analyses the state of EU integration in defence since the war on Ukraine. Drawing on hypotheses developed under 'new intergovernmentalism', this article analyses how EU Member State preferences in defence and intergovernmental-supranational dynamics are being shaped by the war. In particular, the article probes how supranational and intergovernmental institutions have reacted to the war and how domestic preferences have fed into recent EU defence efforts. In doing so, the article provides a preliminary assessment of the state of EU integration in defence since Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

L'un des chapitres du livre : "L'Union européenne et la paix", de Laurence Potvin-Solis (Bruylant, 2023).
Nouvel instrument financier extrabudgétaire de l’Union, créé dans le cadre du dernier cadre financier pluriannuel 2021-2027, la Facilité européenne pour la paix (FEP) constitue la contribution particulière de la politique de sécurité et de défense commune (PSDC) aux efforts de paix de l’Union et de la vision holistique qu’elle tente de promouvoir dans le cadre de son système d’action extérieure très singulier. Séduisante de prime abord au regard de ses innovations, la FEP parait victime de son succès notamment après son activation intensive dans le cadre de la guerre en Ukraine : ayant déjà dépensé après seulement 20 mois plus des trois quarts de son budget, elle devra rechercher dans l’urgence de nouveaux moyens, indispensables à la pérennisation des efforts de paix de l’Union propres à sa PSDC.

This Policy Brief will map the actions taken at the EU level to develop military mobility over the past years, with emphasis on the EU Action Plan 2.0. It will also identify and analyse current EU objectives, outline key challenges, and provide recommendations to enhance military mobility in Europe.

Depuis l’échec du projet de Communauté européenne de défense, en août 1954, les pays européens ont exploré de multiples pistes pour tenter de construire une « Europe de la défense », mais avec des succès très mitigés. L’échec de la CED a-t-il pesé sur les tentatives suivantes ? C’est l’hypothèse de cette communication, qui tentera de mettre en avant quelques écueils nés de la querelle de la CED sur lesquels ont buté les projets d’Europe de la défense depuis 1954, et notamment trois problématiques récurrentes : celle du lien entre Europe de la défense et OTAN ; celle des frontières géographiques de l’Europe à construire ; et enfin les contradictions de la politique française.

The Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU) preserves and makes available to the public the historical documents on the efforts in developing a common European defence policy. The Archives preserves EU-institutional sources as well as the archives of European organisations that worked on defence and security issues in Europe, notably the Western European Union established in 1954. This article gives an overview on the main resources available at the HAEU and gives guidance on the structure and contents of these holdings to facilitate consultation and research.

À l’heure de la guerre en Ukraine, la défense de l’Europe est redevenue une priorité avec un engagement concret de l’Union européenne et de l’Otan. Dès lors, il est nécessaire et urgent d’améliorer les processus de coopération entre les deux institutions avec des mécanismes plus efficaces.

The aim of this article is to discuss how a weakening transatlantic relationship influences European defence cooperation and integration. It also asks how these observed patterns of weakening EU–US relations can be explained and what the consequences might be for the EU’s efforts to build a stronger and more coherent security and defence policy. Building upon a “comprehensive neo-functionalist” approach first coined by the Norwegian scholar Martin Sæter, European security and defence policy should be seen as part of an externalisation of EU integration as a response to weakening transatlantic relations. The debate on European “strategic autonomy,” the Strategic Compass, and the European “defence package” should therefore be considered as part of such an externalisation process of actively influencing and reshaping the transatlantic relationship.

Les auteurs sont les organisateurs du colloque international « L’Europe de la défense : une longue histoire qui avance », qui s’est tenu les 8 et 9 septembre 2022, aux Archives historiques de l’Union européenne, Villa Salviati à Florence, Italie. Le présent numéro de l’Europe en formation présente les actes de ce colloque.

L’Europe de la défense reste un chantier difficile, complexe et en proie à un certain scepticisme. Or, il est nécessaire de progresser ensemble pour affronter les défis stratégiques actuels. Cela doit passer par une culture de défense partagée entre les différents pays partenaires. L’École de Guerre y participe avec ses homologues.

Le 27 mai, sur proposions de la Commission européenne, le Conseil de l’Union européenne a décidé la création d’un fonds de défense de 150 milliards d’euros. Cet instrument, appelé SAFE (Security Action for Europe), permettra à l’UE de lever des capitaux sur les marchés financiers et d’accorder des prêts aux États membres pour financer des équipements stratégiques.

In this article, we develop a conceptualisation of the relationship between European institutions, governments and defence industries as a European Iron Network. This network is characterized by a web of interactions between governments, firms, sources of finance and innovation, and supranational institutions. The EU ambition to play a far greater future role as outlined in the 2025 Security Action for Europe – SAFE Regulation, the ReArm Europe programme and the White Paper for European Defence introduces new elements to the Iron Network. Crucially, we show that the contemporary European Iron Network is contested and negotiated on multiple levels and thus is different to the more static military-industrial complex models of the US-centric literature.

This report updates and expands the data-driven work of our initial study from September 2024, which concluded that Europe would only be fit for war in several decades. We show that the situation today is even more concerning if Europe aims to be fit for war by 2030. Investment in European technology is essential for modernisation. European weapons tend to be expensive due to low production volumes in a fragmented market; a focus on cost-effectiveness is vital to ensure the EU’s planned €800 billion defence spending is sufficient and fiscally sustainable.
See also: Data Set: Kiel Military Procurement Tracker and previous Kiel Reports

France and Germany agree on the need to further European defence-industrial cooperation, but boast radically different preferences on how to structure such cooperation. Why? To answer this question, we introduce the distinction between the two faces of market size – the first exclusively related to defence, the second including the broader commercial-industrial base. Since Germany is, overall, more competitive than France in the commercial sector but less competitive in the defence one, it will advocate for a full-fledged integration of the European defence market but seek to protect its less competitive defence industry from France by championing autonomy in ad-hoc arms programmes. In turn, France would prefer to leverage its defence-industrial advantage by injecting efficiency on arms programmes but resist pan-EU initiatives to integrate the defence market, which would benefit Germany more over the long-term.

Ever since the European Union (EU) extended its competences to the field of armaments, it has faced a persistent dilemma: how to involve (or not) entities from third countries in the programmes it has launched to support cooperation among its Member States? In particular, how should it include entities from NATO allies that are not EU members? Each time the EU introduces a new initiative in this area, the question inevitably resurfaces at the negotiating table, provoking intense debate. This article examines how the concept of design authority has entered the discussion and analyses the challenges it raises. It also focuses on the new elements that the SAFE programme introduces regarding eligibility.

The European Union needs more money if it is to meet mounting budgetary obligations related to the green transition, competitiveness, foreign policy and repayment of debt from the NextGenerationEU post-pandemic recovery fund. To do all of this, an additional 0.9% of gross national income (GNI) in EU-level spending will be essential* – representing a near doubling of the EU budget as a share of GNI.

At the request of the Polish Council Presidency, the think tank Bruegel has developed a proposal outlining how the EU could finance its rearmament efforts. This proposal backs the European Defence Mechanism (EDM) over the Commission’s SAFE plan, arguing it offers a more effective intergovernmental model to finance defence through joint borrowing, shared procurement, and ownership of military systems.

More than two years into the war, the article asks what structural impact Russia’s invasion has had. How have Europeans responded to the sudden increase in arms demand? This contribution discusses the two most prominent theoretical frameworks on European integration before taking stock of defence industrial responses by introducing a typology of responses. The following discussion criticizes the two theoretical frameworks and presents the regulatory security state (rss) literature as a more insightful approach to understanding the EU’s impact on European defence production. Lastly, based on findings on the EU’s regulatory power, this article suggests a more productive role for the European Union in the defence of Europe.

In this paper, we assess the implications of the recourse to the escape clauses of the Stability and Growth Pact

With the March 2022 Strategic Compass, the EU “set out a common strategic vision and concrete objectives for strengthening the EU’s security and defence policy by 2030.” [1] The Compass noted the deterioration in the strategic environment as a result of the return of war to Europe, increased competition between powers, the complexity of threats to the continent’s security, and the undermining of the principles of the international order. In defence, the member states (MS) recognised the need to invest “more and better in innovative capabilities and technologies, fill strategic gaps, and reduce technological and industrial dependencies.” This brief considers the EU’s progress in the defence industrial domain.

While Europe and the combined West in principle have the resources to outperform Russia because of their larger GDP, the mobilisation of fiscal resources and the commitment to stay the course on a longer-term basis is still lagging. European defence spending has increased substantially in the last few years; however, after years of underinvestment, it will take time for production capacities to be brought online and for stocks to increase again.

Hearing of the new EU Commissioner for Defence and Space, Andrius Kubilius: "Finally, the design of the next MFF and its instruments is ahead of us, and defence will be a key priority. "

In times of the “Zeitenwende” European defence industrial companies face several challenges simultaneously: high fragmentation of the industrial ecosystem and product portfolio, a historic focus on small-volume production of complex weapons systems, the need to expand capacity fast, diverging European national security strategies, Europeanisation of the security sector, and a dominant US defence industry, among others. This article analyses the most likely strategies for the European defence industrial companies as a response to this situation. The analysis is based on 18 semi-structured expert interviews with representatives of the European defence industry, academia, and politicians to identify and assess the strategic options. Porter’s Diamond framework is used to assess the impact of governmental influence, availability of production factors, historic chance, and structure of the value chain on the selection of strategies. The analysis focuses on pan-European industry consolidation, exports, self-funded R&D, internationalisation, co-operation with SMEs, and future large-scale defence co-operation programmes.
Please note this article can be provided to Council staff members on demand. Please contact the Library.

This article examines national parliamentary debates in 13 EU member states of eight CSDP military deployments underway between 2016 and 2021. It reviews discussions about whether, and why, to send troops on EU missions and operations, and the extent to which these debates differ from expectations in the literature derived from involvement in NATO operations. The survey includes small states, which have been previously excluded from such analysis. Drawing on a dataset of 411 statements by national parliamentarians from across Europe, the article employs eight discursive frames to understand how MPs articulate their acceptance (or not) of CSDP deployments. We supplement this with detailed data on national troop contributions.

Although the United States has by far the largest defence budget, the defence expenditure of EU member states totals two- thirds of the US budget. Considering the fact that the US is, in contrast to Europe, very active in the Pacific region, the level of spending in Europe is comparable to that in the US. However, the military capabilities are much weaker. One important reason for the low efficiency of military spending in Europe is the huge degree of fragmentation: there are defence administrations in each country, separate planning and command structures. The military units are separated, and the rules of engagement and political control structures are different and distinct.

Europe must urgently address the question of how to reduce its reliance on the US. Ultimately, it will only move forward by developing more autonomy and a credible programme for stronger European defence capabilities. But what would it take to make Europe more self-sufficient? How much should Europe spend on defence for sufficient deterrence and external security? And how can these targets be achieved?

The realisation that Europe’s defence industry needs political support has taken some time, but it is now an important point of consensus between EU member states and political groupings in the European Parliament. Yet, as this contribution to the Forum argues, defence expenditure is an intensely political affair, which makes our ability to assess the quality of defence investments harder. As we will see in this contribution, defence investment is a necessary factor for stimulating the long-term health of the defence industry. We also discuss how defence spending is assessed and managed in a NATO context in order to underline the specific nature of the EU’s own process of encouraging defence investment among its member states.

The European defence market can be described as a geoeconomically relevant sector that forms part of Europe's overall economy, not least in the way that it is a producer of military capabilities and technologies and a repository of scientific skills. Traditionally, European Union (EU)‐level steps to support and liberalise the sector have reflected a regulatory approach marked by soft law, but in recent years, the EU has also developed financial tools to incentivise defence co‐operation. Looking specifically at the European Defence Fund (EDF), this article views this transition as evidence of a ‘geoeconomic turn’ in European defence market policy that is a response to structural challenges related to technology control, security of supply and geopolitical competition.

This article examines the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) – a regulation adopted by the European Union (EU) in July 2023 to boost the production capabilities of the EU defence industry with a view to supporting Ukraine in the war against Russia. The article explains the context in which the regulation was adopted, examines its content, and discusses its consequences for EU integration in the field of defence. At the same time, however, it also considers some critical aspects of ASAP, highlighting the limitations of the regulation approved by the European Parliament (EP) and the Council – particularly when compared with the original proposal of the European Commission. As the article argues, the ASAP regulation endeavours to support the capacity of the EU defence industry to live up to the challenges posed by the war in Ukraine, funding with EU money ammunitions’ production and procurement. At the same time, ASAP also positions the EU to address in a supranational way a more threatening geo-strategic environment.

Since the end of the Cold War, the defence industry has emerged as a leader in innovative technologies, and the Russo-Ukrainian war has provided a unique opportunity to test these technologies in a real combat scenario. As a result of the geopolitical events of February 2022, the European defence industry has faced unprecedented political, economic, and technological changes. This study examines these transformations through semi-structured, openended, in-depth interviews with twenty-five experts across ten European countries, analysed using qualitative content analysis, with a focus on small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). While perspectives on the necessity of defence innovations vary, there is considerable market demand for both disruptive innovations and the advancement of conventional technologies.

In 2020, EU member-states allocated nearly €8 billion out of the EU's 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) to a new European Defence Fund (EDF). This thesis investigates the European Defence Fund as a case study of how European integration can take place in an area of “high politics” thought to be particularly resistant to integration. It adds nuance to the concept of a “sovereignty orthodoxy” in defence policy and contributes original insight into the nature of the defence sector and its “special” standing in EU integration literature. EU officials involved in the creation of the Fund at the time referred to their initiative as a “Copernican revolution”, insinuating that they were “changing the sun in the system”: defence industrial policy making in the EU would in future revolve around the Commission rather than the member-states. Analysis of the EDF so far has similarly predominantly focused on the role of the Commission as the initiator and main beneficiary of its creation. The roles and objectives of national actors in the creation of the Fund remain under-explored. This thesis argues that even though the creation of the European Defence Fund broke taboos, it was no “Copernican revolution”.

The European Defence Fund (EDF) has for the first time enabled the European Union (EU) to fund military equipment development in pursuit of its strategic autonomy. But the EDF was based on competences for supporting industrial and research competitiveness, and not on the Common Foreign and Security Policy/Common Security and Defence Policy (CFSP/CSDP). Since EU legal acts must be based on the functionally most appropriate competence, this choice of legal basis raises questions. This article therefore analyses whether the EDF was correctly adopted under a non-CFSP/CSDP legal basis, and if so, how its legal basis affects its capacity to contribute to EU strategic autonomy. The analysis reveals that the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) grants the EU a competence to support defence-industrial competitiveness which is separate from the CFSP/CSDP, but stands in service to its military-strategic objectives.

La guerre en Ukraine a joué un rôle de catalyseur pour la défense européenne. Si des mesures ont logiquement été prises dans le domaine de la PESC et de la PSDC, des actes importants ont également été adoptés en urgence dans le domaine « communautaire » afin d'aider l'Ukraine, tout en renforçant la base industrielle et technologique de défense européenne. Cela passe par le soutien de l'Union, à la fois aux acquisitions conjointes dans le secteur de la défense, prévue par le règlement « EDIRPA », et à la production de munitions par les États membres, qui fait l'objet du règlement « ASAP ». Ces deux instruments de court terme contribuent notablement à la « communautarisation rampante » de la défense européenne, et témoignent du rôle incontournable actuellement joué par la Commission européenne en la matière.

The EU defence industry may not be as fragmented as is often claimed. New EU initiatives should therefore focus on supporting long-term demand for critical enablers such as strategic transport, SatCom services and airborne surveillance.

This paper finds that developing such capability [a defence industrial and technological base (DITB)] is well within the capacity of the EU and its member states and proposes a series of measures by which it can be financed. It analyses the composition of the defence budgets of EDA members between 2017 and 2021, and assesses their levels of defence investment, research and development, and “research and technology” (R&T - fundamental technological research that is itself an input to R&D). It identifies gaps and recommends EU policies and instruments to close them.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has shaken up the EU approach to defence matters. Funds have been released to help in providing Ukraine with ammunition. More interesting, the European Defence Agency (EDA) has taken up a more active role in the procurement of defence materials.
While these developments are still limited, a partial centralisation of defence procurement at EU level seems to be in the cards.

Since the Treaty of Lisbon, signed in 2007, the common security and defence policy shall include the progressive framing of a common Union defence policy, which may lead to a common defence. However, the key question is the financing of such policy. To address this issue, several taboos have been progressively lifted in terms of financial resources, both out of the EU Budget with new players (notably the European Defence Agency) and new instruments (especially the European Peace Facility) and within the EU Budget, with a multiplication of initiatives to reinforce the European defence industry (from the first dedicated program in 2017 to the new instrument for supporting the production of ammunition in 2023). The Ukrainian war was and is still a decisive factor to contribute to and accelerate that evolution.

Now that European defence budgets are (finally) on the rise, Europe’s military circles are faced with one issue that has not been addressed at EU level: how do they want to fight? The US-led NATO alliance rightfully coordinates all doctrinal work in Europe at the moment, but the time to discuss how soldiers and weapons function in larger operations is coming, considering the US’s gradual withdrawal amid increasing turmoil in the neighbourhood. Having these field concepts in place would demonstrate the determination and cohesiveness of the Europe of today while shaping the military procurement of tomorrow.

The European Union's competences in armament policy have increased and its policy instruments have shifted towards military capacity-building. Illustrative of this, the European Defence Fund (EDF) finances cooperative research and development programmes in defence. Given military capacity-building's centrality for statehood, I investigate the EDF to analyse the extent to which it challenges national prerogatives. I argue that the EDF represents a change away from the European Union's regulatory role, and yet, does not correspond to a 'positive' supranational security state. Instead, the EDF represents a hybrid military capacity-building instrument, combining national ownership and EU (co-)financing of defence capacities. This argument builds conceptually on the state-building scholarship's distinction between the centralisation of military and financial resources and adapts it to the EU multilevel governance.

Significant increases in defence spending in European NATO and European Union member states are intended to address long-standing capability shortfalls, support the modernisation and growth of armed forces, replenish stocks, and fill gaps created by the transfer of equipment and munitions to Ukraine. Yet Europe's defence-industrial base will struggle to meet this increased demand in the short term.

Le panorama de l’industrie de défense en Europe est complexe avec des situations et des ambitions très différentes, en particulier liées à la relation avec les États-Unis. Les asymétries sont nombreuses, d’où la difficulté de passer du discours incantatoire sur une autonomie stratégique aux actes la concrétisant.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 marked a critical turning point in European security, reintroducing high-intensity land warfare and dismantling the illusion of perpetual peace. The European Union’s (EU) Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), conceived in the post-Cold War era during a period of relative stability, has struggled to meet the demands of a rapidly evolving wartime environment. As a result, the war in Ukraine has forced the EU and its Member States into uncharted territory in foreign, security, and defence policy. The EU has provided substantial support to Ukraine and taken significant steps to bolster its defence capabilities, demonstrating the CFSP’s capacity to adapt under pressure. The EU has overhauled its strategies, launched new missions, expanded its defence industry, and signed key agreements. Yet, critical questions remain: Have these efforts been sufficient to secure the EU’s geopolitical relevance in Europe?

The EU may need to deploy a peacekeeping force to Ukraine. However, without urgent regulatory changes, its member states are unprepared for the risks of direct confrontation with Russia

To meet the future challenges of the European security space, we submit three policy recommendations:
1. Surging support of bilateral joint ventures between NATO member states and Ukrainian defence tech companies and start-ups.
2. Negotiating bilateral civil- military liaisons to interface with the full spectrum of Ukraine’s drone ecosystem
3. Committing to binding defence tech orders to vest capital and political trust into NATO-Ukrainian joint ventures.

A future enlarged EU, including Ukraine, should take full advantage of the lower-cost military production capabilities of Ukraine

Ukraine stands at a critical juncture as it approaches the fourth year of the war against Russian aggression. The brief suggests that the Nordic-Baltic coalition (Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) can enhance support for Ukraine by sharing military expertise, increasing defence cooperation, and promoting economic resilience. These efforts would help counter Russian influence and strengthen European security.

Ukraine is unlikely to be able to cope on the battlefield if Donald Trump's administration cuts off new requests for aid. A Russian military victory against Ukraine would entail massive increases in the burden borne by NATO's current members to preclude Moscow's intended reversal of the strategic effects of the break-up of the Soviet Union. Even a Ukraine territorially diminished by way of a deal imposed by Trump would likely end successful post-Second World War efforts to counter the unilateral annexation of a European state's legal territory and potentially change Russia's assessment of what Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty means in practice.

The authors suggest that a ceasefire deal with Russia will not ensure Ukraine’s long-term security. They argue for a multilayered defence system that could prevent another invasion while being financially sustainable for Ukraine’s allies.

This article explores the European Union's (EU's) assistance to Ukraine through the lens of critical geopolitics with a view to ascertaining whether the EU has become more geopolitical in its thinking and actions towards Eastern Europe. Our findings point to a mixed picture. Whilst the EU ‘mindscape’ appears to have shifted in relation to Eastern Europe, Ukraine and itself as an actor in the region, it is less apparent that the EU's foreign and security policy action has become geopoliticised.

By comparing Slovenia’s Presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU) in 2008 and 2021 the article aims to provide lessons learnt and suggestions for enhancing the benefits of EU membership in the future. We first analyse the two very different institutional, geo-political and geo-economic contexts during which Slovenia conducted its Presidency stints, before analysing how the changed context reflected on Slovenia’s preparation, organization, the objectives and the achievements of the Presidency. The comparison of both Presidencies demonstrates fundamental changes in the country’s relationship to the EU and limitations of the ‘Presidency effect’ for times of ‘ordinary’ membership

The article proceeds to map the debate about EU reform, the ongoing stalemate and the open questions concerning the future of Europe in order to illustrate fully the impact of the war in Ukraine on the enlargement project.

Mykhailo Samus talks to European Defence Matters about why investing in Ukrainian armament production is less politically sensitive than sending weapons. "With funds from Denmark, a Ukrainian plant has produced 18 Ukrainian self-propelled Bogdana howitzers at a speed that European facilities have not been able to match"

There has been a significant response to the war in Ukraine on the part of the European Union (EU). Particularly noteworthy is its support for Kyiv via measures in the framework of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) and especially in the defence field. It has provided substantial assistance to the Ukrainian Armed Forces through the European Peace Facility (EPF); the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) and the EDIRPA common procurement instrument; and its military assistance mission (EUMAM Ukraine). These initiatives show how, in the wake of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, the CSDP has made unprecedented, yet still only partial steps to allow the EU to progress towards moving beyond its traditional status as a small power.
The full text articles of this issue are available only in Spanish language.

In Ukraine itself and among America's NATO allies, there is disbelief that in a United States with still-strong public support for Ukraine, and two Houses of Congress that reflect that support in large, bipartisan, pro-Ukraine majorities, $60 billion in renewed military aid for Ukraine may remain forever blocked. The reason is that Donald Trump, now the front-runner for the forthcoming US presidential election, wants to deny President Joe Biden a political victory and has prevailed on House Republicans to grant his wish. If America's democracy is on the ballot in the election, so, it would seem, is its global power. Even if Biden is re-elected, the Ukraine impasse suggests that may not be enough to salvage either.

This article examines the Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP) – a regulation adopted by the European Union (EU) in July 2023 to boost the production capabilities of the EU defence industry with a view to supporting Ukraine in the war against Russia. The article explains the context in which the regulation was adopted, examines its content, and discusses its consequences for EU integration in the field of defence.

As we face war and escalating hybrid threats on our continent, multiple crises in our neighbourhood and the world, and as we seek to uphold the rules-based international order and reaffirming our ambitions of the Treaty of Aix-La-Chapelle, France and Germany are convinced that Franco-German cooperation in matters of foreign, security and defence policy should be further deepened; it should strengthen the ability of Europe to meet its challenges on its own.

As the war in Ukraine rages on and the second Trump administration encourages Europeans to take ownership of conventional defence within NATO, the European Union (EU) has launched a flurry of initiatives in recent years to bolster Europe’s military capabilities and revitalise Europe’s defence industrial and technological base. What does this mean for Spain? Spain is often singled out as a laggard when it comes to defence spending. To be sure, input metrics – such as spending – provide an incomplete picture about an ally’s contribution to collective security. And Spain’s ongoing commitment to NATO and EU missions paints a somewhat more positive picture. Moreover, after years of under-investment, Spain announced a €10.4 billion increase in defence expenditure in 2025, aiming to meet NATO’s 2% GDP target. However, questions remain about the sustainability and focus of this investment, particularly as future NATO targets may increase to 3% or 5% of GDP.

Although centered on Italy, this analysis offers broader implications for European countries grappling with the tension between security imperatives, fiscal constraints and political legitimacy. The proposed approach, which combines a calibrated increase in defense spending, institutional reform and a redefinition of defense accounting, constitutes a replicable model adaptable to diverse national contexts. The Italian case thus serves as a strategic template to inform policy decisions across the Alliance.

La movilización de recursos del Plan permitirá mejorar las condiciones de las Fuerzas Armadas, modernizar sus equipos y desarrollar nuevas tecnologías sin comprometer el gasto social ni la cooperación al desarrollo.

The Permanent Structured Cooperation in Defence (PESCO) and the European Defence Fund (EDF) constitute another attempt to consolidate the European defence market. In this article, we explain the different engagements of Czechia and Portugal in the two initiatives until 2021 through the evolution and reform of the domestic institutions governing their defence industrial policies. We trace how the institutions were established, how they contributed to the national position on PESCO and EDF and how the two countries' defence industries became involved. The article shows how the different institutionalisation of the defence sector allowed Portugal and its companies to participate more than their Czech counterparts. We offer an insight into the practice of European defence co‐operation and identify processes that challenge further integration.

In 2024 military expenditure in Spain was just 1.3% of GDP, the lowest level of any NATO member. Overall military spending by NATO countries now averages 2.7% of GDP, above the bloc’s 2% target, suggesting that Spain is spending less than half the NATO average, as a percent of economic output. Although pressure from the US president, Donald Trump, for European countries to spend more on defence will largely be effective, Spain will remain a laggard. We believe that it is unlikely that Spain will meet NATO’s 2% of GDP military spending target until 2029 at the earliest.

L’accélération du système géopolitique avec l’augmentation des crises et des conflits oblige l’Europe, et la France en particulier, à revoir son approche stratégique. Il est nécessaire de construire une nouvelle ambition, profitant de capacités industrielles et technologiques crédibles. Notre autonomie pour agir doit être une priorité afin de conforter notre souveraineté, en liaison avec nos partenaires.

Spain needs to adapt its approach to the rapid evolution of the EU’s policy on the defence industry.

With NATO likely to raise its goal for members' spending on defence, Luxembourg will need to reassess its current policy. For many decades the country has spent the least in relative terms of all NATO members, albeit in line with other European countries. However, the Grand Duchy has in recent years been ramping up its commitment. This change already implied substantial budgetary and organisational challenges for the government.

The security and defence of the Federal Republic of Germany relies on a whole-of-state and wholeof-society approach as well as a policy of integrated security. This requires the cooperation of all relevant actors, resources and instruments. The combination of these elements will comprehensively guarantee Germany’s security and strengthen it against internal and external threats according to the principle: robust, resilient, sustainable.

Leadership is crucial for the success of a collective actor in reaching common goals. Its relevance is particularly visible in the EU, due to the difficulty in managing and converging a wide range of interests, especially in the intergovernmental field of defence. This article analyses Franco-German transactional leadership throughout the evolution of the EU's security and defence policy, with a focus on the effects of Brexit. By highlighting the concept of leadership in international relations, this study identifies Franco-German actions and strategies within the Common Security and Defence Policy, reflecting on how these have shaped European defence and how Brexit changed existing dynamics. We conclude that France and Germany have led the EU's security and defence project, albeit with limited success, with a shift towards a successful relaunch of EU defence in the aftermath of Brexit, aided by doubts over NATO and war in Ukraine.

The new defence policy of the European Union (EU) is forcing the defence industry in Europe to adjust its strategies, especially since the invasion of Ukraine. Both the European Commission and the European Defence Agency (EDA) are pushing for a European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB), taking account of factors that include the fragmentation of supply chains, the significant efficiency gains that can be made and the prospect of greater EU strategic autonomy. In the industrial field, particularly in the area of technology, it will change the shape of the European defence industry. But what direction will this new industry take? Will national oligopolies be reinforced at the same time as other European oligopolies emerge? Drawing on an empirical analysis based on interviews with experts, this paper focuses on Spain as a case study.
Article in Spanish

La dissuasion nucléaire est au cœur de notre politique de défense depuis 60 ans. Si la France a toujours fait effort pour assurer la crédibilité de la dissuasion, l’Europe confrontée à la guerre imposée par la Russie à l’Ukraine est en train de réapprendre cette grammaire nucléaire. Celle-ci est, plus que jamais, au centre des enjeux pour garantir la sécurité du continent européen, aujourd’hui directement menacée.

France and Germany agree on the need to further European defence-industrial cooperation, but boast radically different preferences on how to structure such cooperation. Why? To answer this question, we introduce the distinction between the two faces of market size – the first exclusively related to defence, the second including the broader commercial-industrial base. Since Germany is, overall, more competitive than France in the commercial sector but less competitive in the defence one, it will advocate for a full-fledged integration of the European defence market but seek to protect its less competitive defence industry from France by championing autonomy in ad-hoc arms programmes. In turn, France would prefer to leverage its defence-industrial advantage by injecting efficiency on arms programmes but resist pan-EU initiatives to integrate the defence market, which would benefit Germany more over the long-term.

By starting the war with Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin has trampled the cooperative and democratic security order in Europe agreed upon in 1990, seeking to replace it with the tyranny of empire. If Russian aggression is not repelled in Ukraine, Moscow will be in a strong position to threaten and coerce the rest of Europe. The West needs to prepare for a long war. Sweden applied for NATO membership out of a sense of moral outrage, but also felt compelled to follow the realist instincts of its close geographical and historical neighbour Finland, which sensed imminent danger. In Europe as in Sweden, idealism and practical compulsion have converged. The West must decisively turn back Russia's assault on Europe's peaceful order by helping Ukrainians preserve their nation substantially

In spring 2023, Germany presented its first National Security Strategy. A remarkably clear document by German standards, it reflects the fact that the Zeitenwende (turning point) precipitated by the Russian invasion of Ukraine has already taken place in the minds of German policymakers and the German people, and signals a militarily stronger and politically more realistic Germany in the future. The protection of Germany and its allies tops the list of security-policy interests. Next comes strengthening European Union and NATO partnerships, as well as bilateral ones with France and the United States. Russia is seen as an imminent threat, and the West's rivalry with China is considered a major challenge. The Bundeswehr is framed as the core security-policy instrument for countering threats and as the guarantor of Germany's deterrence and defence capabilities. The document also explicitly enshrines the 2%-of-GDP target for defence spending.

The coining of the concept of ‘European sovereignty’ by French President Emmanuel Macron in 2017 has prompted a heated debate, reviving disputes over supranationality, the nation-state and democracy that have resonated since the inception of the European project. Macron’s intervention came at a time when a flurry of crises compelled the European Union to move from its ambition of being a ‘normative power’ to living through its ‘Machiavellian moment’, against the backdrop of the rise of new global powers and existential threats for the security of the Union and its member states. But the term ‘European sovereignty’ is a misnomer. The real issue is one of power, not of sovereignty. Power proceeds from command, hardly an attribute of the complex shared decision-making process of the EU, leaving the objective of becoming a fully-fledged power out of reach for the European polity.

Le rejet par le parlement français en août 1954 du projet de Communauté européenne de défense (CED) a été motivé – en partie – par le fait que, si ce projet avait été appliqué, il aurait interdit à la France de pouvoir lancer et développer librement son programme nucléaire de défense. Il n’en reste pas moins que ce programme fut lancé effectivement – et ce de manière indépendante – à la fin de cette même année 1954. Et, de manière emblématique, un débat similaire se posa peu après avec la première version du projet de Communauté européenne de l’énergie atomique (Euratom). On le voit, le cadre européen a pesé dès le début du lancement du programme nucléaire de défense français dans un sens qui ne lui était pas favorable… alors même que des initiatives furent prises très tôt par des responsables politiques et militaires français en faveur d’un « pool atomique européen » dans le domaine de la défense.

European strategic autonomy has attracted a great deal of attention in recent years, but the discussion has largely been Euro-centric and overlooked the American perspective. This paper addresses this scholarly gap by reviewing European strategic autonomy from the US perspective. The paper focuses on two groups: political decision-makers (such as presidents, secretaries of state and defence) and foreign policy influencers (people working in think tanks and research institutes). By analysing their speeches, statements, and reports over nearly 25 years (1998–2022), the paper provides a review of the American debate on European strategic autonomy, its complexities, and its evolving nature. The paper concludes that the American debate on European strategic autonomy is more multivocal and complex than is often understood in Europe. The arguments for and against strategic autonomy coexist and are relatively permanent. Especially the debate among decision-makers has shown little fluctuation across the last five administrations, while policy influencers present a more varied discourse, revealing distinct perspectives. The paper demonstrates the nuanced nature of US attitudes towards European security and defence, which decision-makers in Europe should pay close attention to.