EU Enlargement: Articles

The Ukraine war has put both EU enlargement, and fundamental reform, back on the table – but the window of opportunity won’t stay open for long.

Main focus of the debate was to provide an overview of the current positions of certain Member states toward a possible shift to Qualified Majority Voting in Common Foreign and Security Policy of the EU, and to discuss potential positive and negative aspects of this decision, taking into consideration relevant arguments that will shape the outcomes of the broader discussion on how to make the EU more actionable while protecting crucial national interests of each Member state.

Recent Eurobarometer surveys have registered an unprecedentedly high number of EU citizens in favour of new EU enlargements, suggesting that this might be the right time for decision-makers in Brussels to embark on a bold reform of EU enlargement policy in order to put this policy on a more effective and sustainable path.

Um die Erweiterung der Union voranzubringen, muss diese sich erst einmal intern zu Reformen durchringen. Aber gibt es die politische Kraft und den Willen dazu überhaupt?

Les pays candidats sont trop nombreux et dispersés dans leur avancement pour rendre crédible une date-limite commune d’entrée en bloc dans l’UE. Une adhésion graduelle éviterait la cristallisation du débat autour d’une date-butoir et permettrait d’opérer progressivement un élargissement auquel l’UE doit aussi se préparer et engager l’opinion.

Russia’s brutal war on Ukraine, rising tensions within and across regions and the weakening of global order structures have shattered the certainties on which the EU was built. Transnational challenges, such as climate change, security threats and food and health crises urgently require cooperative solutions. With Russia’s war on Ukraine, the geostrategic role of the EU has dramatically changed through the large-scale military, humanitarian, financial and diplomatic support it provides. The debate about the EU’s capacity to act and its overall sovereignty has intensified and the continent’s architecture and the EU’s relationship with its neighbours in the East and South need to be thoroughly rethought due to the grave threats posed to the European security order.

After a lost decade-and-a-half that saw the establishment of German predominance, there is now the acute danger of Berlin and Paris applying rejected ideas to enlarging and reforming the EU: Four principles for a future-oriented EU expansion and adaptation.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has made the enlargement file a priority. While a gradual approach is necessary to balance the ever-increasing heterogeneity of Member States as a result of further enlargement, respect of the EU’s fundamental values must remain the key condition for membership. On the other hand, in order to accommodate a large number of new members, the EU must implement a number of reforms, in the first instance in the institutional domain. Only treaty changes will allow for the reforms necessary to realise such enlargement.

La problématique de l’élargissement, jusqu’ici vécue comme un accomplissement du projet européen, s’inscrit désormais dans un contexte international neuf. Ce dernier contraint l’Union européenne à dépasser les classiquesdimensions juridique et géographique de sa réflexion, au profit d’uneapproche véritablement géopolitique de ses relations avec ses environnements. La Communauté politique européenne s’inscrit dans la logique de remodelage du continent qu’impose la guerre en Ukraine.

The planned enlargement of the EU changes the context of the discussion on the reform of the Community. The report, commissioned by the French and German governments, presents a catalogue of reforms necessary for the admission of new states. It also includes recommendations to strengthen the rule of law and rebuild the EU’s institutional architecture and the EU budget. The authors recommend amending the treaties and propose greater differentiation of integration.

Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine has affected the geopolitics of the European continent like no event since 1989 and the end of Cold War.

Russia’s war of aggression has brought Ukraine, Moldova, and Georgia closer to EU membership. To play an effective role in the democratization of these three countries, the EU needs a differentiated approach based on the political dynamics of each state.

The European Union (EU) revived the enlargement process in response to the Russia-Ukraine war. That reaction compares to how the EU utilized this process following the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s. In this paper, authors argue that on neither occasion was the inclusion of more states within EU borders a preferred EU working agenda. Instead, the EU used enlargement as a stabilization and security-building mechanism without guaranteeing membership as the end state. This observation has implications for the future of the enlargement process. The authors argue that the outcome of the previous rounds of enlargement was reactive and context-driven. Absent those same contextual factors, and although the EU reacts to the Russia-Ukraine war in a familiar sequence of incomplete decision-making, the outcome of this wartime enlargement negotiation process points in a different direction.

The EU’s decision to grant Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine membership perspective signals a more strategic approach to enlargement. But an overhaul of the process is needed to enable staged accession and prevent a stalemate.

Face à la nouvelle donne géopolitique provoquée par l’invasion russe de l’Ukraine, l’Union européenne doit se reposer sérieusement la question de la poursuite du processus d’élargissement, en direction notamment de deux groupes de pays : les Balkans occidentaux et le « trio oriental », à savoir l’Ukraine, la Moldavie (qui bénéficient déjà du statut de pays candidat) et la Géorgie (à laquelle seule une « perspective européenne » est reconnue).

It was welcome news last week that the European Commission had approved the 2023 Enlargement Package, which has been regarded as historic because it covers ten aspiring members toward accession - the first time in many years. It marks a turn towards the East, with Commission President Ursula von der Leyen declaring in her press conference, “Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine chose clearly where they want to go”.

The prospects for progress in the process of accession to the European Union (EU) primarily revolve around two core areas: enhancing domestic readiness within the candidate countries in the Western Balkans as well as Ukraine and Moldova, and adapting the EU’s enlargement toolbox to ensure the accession process is effective and irreversible.

Admitting countries from Eastern Europe and the Balkans would complete the European project. But before further enlargement, the union has to ensure the rule of law and security inside the bloc.

This policy analysis will provide, in Chapter 1, a comprehensive overview of ongoing and sought-after regional initiatives with the aim to solidify Western Balkan regional integration, in order to best assess what is what, what is working, and what should be the way forward. The Analysis argues, in Chapter 2, that unclear initiatives such as the Open Balkan should not be pursued, while the Berlin Process has proven to be and remain the most significant and consequential initiative to best attain eventual Euro-Atlantic integration of Kosovo and its Balkan neighbors.

Después de años de «fatiga europea» respecto a la ampliación, la futura entrada de nuevos miembros ha vuelto a la agenda de la Unión Europea (UE). El objetivo es acomodar la Unión a los efectos derivados de la guerra en Ucrania y, en este contexto, los Balcanes occidentales adquieren una nueva importancia geopolítica. Sin embargo, para que el proceso sea creíble, es necesario proporcionar recursos adecuados, fortalecer la diplomacia en el frente suroriental y afrontar la reestructuración institucional de la UE a fin de articular una organización y funcionamiento ágiles y eficientes, desde la unidad de acción.

Russia’s brutal invasion of Ukraine has served as a wake-up call for the European Union (EU) and added urgency to the discussion of EU enlargement. Russia’s war has highlighted the need to fast-track the accession process for Ukraine and Moldova, and to revitalize it for the Western Balkans countries not yet in the EU: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. Earlier this month, EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell even welcomed a 2030 deadline for the next enlargement, hoping that this will mobilize energies both in the EU and in candidate states. The question now is how to get candidate countries ready to join the bloc.

There is a gap between the six countries of the Western Balkans (WB6) and their partners in the European Union (EU) in human capital, the quality of its infrastructure, the structure of the economy, and the quality of local institutions, factors that condition the WB6 growth rate. The speed of WB6 convergence towards the EU defines the pace of enlargement progress.

The EU created the Eastern Partnership (EaP) over a decade ago, opening up new possibilities for growth and investment for the six partner countries: Georgia, Moldova, Ukraine, Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan. This study, prepared by CEPS, brings us a comparative picture of progress among the Western Balkan and EaP EU associated countries.

Bilateral disputes, of which there are many in the Western Balkans, continue to cast a dark shadow over the countries of the region. Individual EU Member States involved in some of these disputes have used them to raise issues that have nothing to do with the EU accession criteria, effectively blocking the EU’s enlargement agenda. Thus, the EU’s failure to put forward an overall strategy to address these disputes has undermined the overall credibility of the EU’s enlargement policy towards the region.

On January 31, 2003, the then president of the European Commission, Romano Prodi, visited Tirana and held a speech in the Albanian parliament, declaring the opening of negotiations for signing the Stabilization and Association Agreement between the EU and Albania. Almost 20 years later, on July 19, 2022, Albania officially started the accession negotiations.

A breakthrough in Kosovo-EU relations occurred with the submission of the official application for EU membership. In a rather symbolic act, the President of Kosovo Vjosa Osmani-Sadriu, Prime Minister Albin Kurti and the Speaker of the Parliament Glauk Konjufca signed the application for membership on 14 December 2022. On the 15th of December Prime Minister Kurti submitted the bid for EU membership in Prague to the Czech Republic, the holders of EU rotating presidency at the time. On its side, Kosovo formalized an application process that would take years, if not decades, to finalize.

Kosovo is a potential candidate for membership in the European Union (EU) as it formally submitted its application in December 2022. Compared to the rest of the Western Balkans, its European perspective is particularly clouded due to the lack of a comprehensive legally binding agreement with Serbia on normalisation of relations, as well as a result of refusal of five EU Member States (MS) to recognize the country as an independent state.

This paper seeks to compare the quality of governance of the non-EU member states of the Western Balkans and certain states of Eastern Europe, namely Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine, which share Association Agreements with the EU. Both groups of states aspire to full membership of the EU. While the EU differentiates between the two groups, acknowledging the ‘European perspectives’ (i.e. future EU membership) of the former but not of the latter, the commitments to achieve EU political and economic standards and to adopt or approximate to EU law and policies made by both groups are similar. This makes comparisons between the two groups both feasible and politically significant.

Since the beginning of the year, disputes have been mounting in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) over the directions and sources of new gas supplies. These mainly concern the construction of a gas interconnector with Croatia. The project has been under consideration for over a decade; a letter of intent to this effect was signed in 2011. However, real progress only began a few years ago after the European Commission (the Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, DG NEAR) approved of the gas pipeline construction design in July 2019.

Following its veto of the opening of accession talks with North Macedonia and Albania in October 2019, the French government circulated a non-paper proposing an overhaul of the EU accession procedure. The document outlined a comprehensive reform based on a reinforced “carrot & stick” approach. In response, nine EU member states led by Italy, Poland, Austria and Slovenia shared their own vision of a reformed accession process, less ambitious in terms of scope and retaining more flexibility. Drawing on these reform options, the Commission designed its own reform plan for the EU accession talks, integrating elements from both non-papers.

The European Commission has set a target date of 2025 for Western Balkan EU accession, while also outlining a broader new strategy which includes Brussels taking a more active role in solving political disputes in the region and upgrading infrastructure as part of the Berlin Process. Even if the region takes a great leap forward towards the EU, there are other barriers in the way which could also hold back accession. Nevertheless, the 2025 target could also serve as a powerful incentive for countries in the region to speed up their reform agendas.

Notă de poziție pe marginea includerii reformei sectorului companiilor de stat în Planul de acțiuni.

Failing to open EU membership negotiations with Moldova by the end of the year would be a strategic mistake and would be exploited by Russia. A stable, secure, and pro-European Moldova will strengthen the security and stability of the EU’s Eastern Flank.

Élue présidente de la Moldavie au suffrage universel direct en novembre 2020, Maia Sandu a su obtenir une large majorité au Parlement à l’occasion des élections législatives anticipées de juillet 2021. Son projet de transformation interne de la Moldavie est étroitement lié à l’objectif de rapprochement de ce pays avec l’Union européenne. De ce point de vue, la guerre en Ukraine a joué un rôle d’accélérateur de l’histoire, puisque la République de Moldavie s’est vue reconnaître le statut de pays candidat à l’UE lors du Conseil européen du 23 juin 2022.

In June 2022, the European Council granted Moldova EU candidate status, on the understanding that Moldova would have to fulfil nine conditions before accession negotiations could begin.

La Moldavie a été récemment mise en lumière en accueillant le 1er juin le sommet de la Communauté politique européenne et les quarante-cinq dirigeants d’Etats qui ont voulu manifester leur soutien à ce pays, où l’inquiétude est grande devant l’invasion par la Russie de l’Ukraine voisine. Cette agression a amené les Vingt-Sept à hâter politiquement le processus d’adhésion, en reconnaissant à la Moldavie, en même temps qu’à l’Ukraine, le statut de pays candidat en juin 2022.

Moldova on 5 November held local elections, the first since pro-European President Maia Sandu took power in December 2020 and her Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS) in August 2021. Although a second round will be necessary in about a third of self-governments, the results of the first round indicate PAS was the winner. Although it failed to gain power in Chişinău, it expanded its influence in local governments across the country. The Moldovan government successfully resisted Russian attempts to destabilise the state by not allowing Şansă (Chance) Party candidates to run in the elections.

On December 16, 2023, the European Council is expected to formally kick off the accession negotiations with Kyiv, following a defined schedule. Ukraine’s accession to the European Union (EU) is necessary and inevitable, but it may prove very costly for the current European member states.

The challenge of integrating Ukraine into the EU requires Europe to find ways of deciding more promptly and efficiently on matters of common concern. Such institutional improvements are of essential importance for the EU, but they cannot be disconnected from the use of its resources. The EU needs larger financial resources of its own, and it must set up a European spending and taxation capacity to bolster its budget before its enlargement to Ukraine and the other Eastern European countries takes place. To effectively use this larger fiscal capacity, the EU needs institutions that European citizens believe are responsible stewards of their money, as well as for the upstream political choices.

The European Commission is considering launching Ukraine's accession process to the European Union by the end of 2023. This initiative will open a wave of enlargement to other candidate Eastern European countries. The process has huge political, financial, and institutional implications that no one can predict today, and that tomorrow could put pressure on the Union's integrity itself.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022 shattered any remaining illusions that closer economic integration with Europe would lead Russia, over time, towards democracy at home and peaceful coexistence with its neighbors abroad. It reinvigorated the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and jolted the European Union (EU) into cutting off trade and energy ties with Russia, while welcoming a massive flow of refugees from war-torn Ukraine. It empowered Central and East European states in the EU, reignited enlargement debates, and shifted NATO and Europe's borders to the north and east. Introducing a special issue, this article argues that the EU's peace through integration strategy has always existed side by side with NATO's peace through strength approach, in a broader European project with blurred boundaries. This war may force the EU to solidify its borders between an internal zone of integration and an external zone of strength projection and geopolitics.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and its consequences are reshaping the geopolitical balance of the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood region.

The war may have changed the political winds within and between member states about enlarging the European Union, but it has not altered the immutable challenges around the EU’s capacity for expansion. The prospect of opening accession negotiations with a country as large, poor, and scarred as Ukraine has renewed debates about “absorption capacity” and multi-speed Europe, thus revealing existing member states’ anxieties about widening the EU without deepening it.

On 8 November, the European Commission backed Ukraine, along with Moldova, to begin European Union accession negotiations. The decision is promising for Ukraine, whose war effort against Russia’s invasion hinges on strong EU relations, as does its post-war future.

Once Kyiv has reasonably met the European Commission’s seven steps, opening accession negotiations with Ukraine must be a geopolitical imperative for the EU.

2023 is a crucial year in Georgia. It could even be historic, in the hope that it does not turn dramatic. At the end of the year, the twenty seven members of the European Union must decide whether or not to grant the former Soviet republic the status of candidate country.

Georgia’s path to EU membership is a strategic dilemma for the bloc: reward a country for democratic backsliding or leave it vulnerable to further Russian influence. To avoid shattering the hopes of a pro-EU population, a middle ground is needed.

A few days before the European Commission decides whether to grant Georgia EU candidate country status, Tbilisi still has work to do. While Georgia must make a big final reform push, at the same time, the EU needs to be shrewd and avoid making rash decisions that could jeopardise its influence not only in Georgia but throughout the region.

The announcement of EU candidate status is both a boon for Georgia and a geopolitical challenge, given possible retaliation from Russia.

The Georgian government’s attempt to pass restrictive legislation on foreign influence provoked mass protests that ultimately led to the withdrawal of the bill. To anchor Georgia to Western values, the EU should support the country's transition to institutional democracy.

In June 2022, the EU granted Georgia a membership perspective and the prospect of receiving candidate country status, subject to Tbilisi meeting 12 conditions. However, with growing concerns about democratic backsliding, Georgia’s EU ambitions are being jeopardised. It is time for Georgia – the government and the opposition – to stop this self-sabotage and start working together towards a common goal.

On February 28th, 2022, Ukraine submitted an application concerning accession to the European Union. With about 41 million inhabitants, Ukraine is a rather large country and the 65% majority requirement under the EU’s Qualified Majority Voting rules would give Ukraine some significant power in a future EU28. Herein, it is shown how relative political power indices - as measured by the Banzhaf index - would change in the case of an EU enlargement to allow accession by Ukraine: the large economies would lose power and, surprisingly, many small countries would gain political power. Such perspectives might lead one to reconsider the voting procedures of the Council of the European Union at the EU level in the course of future negotiations on amendments to the Lisbon Treaty. The case of Turkey’s accession is also considered as is the case of Montenegro joining the European Union.

The ongoing EU–Turkey accession negotiations are probably the most complextalks related to the enlargement process in the EU’s history. Although they were initiated in 2005, so far both sides have managed to provisionally close only one out of 35 negotiation chapters. What’s more, the bilateral relations between the EU and Turkey are growing more and more tense. The most recent developments only prove that thetalks may grind to a halt. It seems that both sides are tired of the endless negotiations andunexpected events, like the 2016 coup d’état in Turkey. The main aim of this article is to analyse the current political developments related to EU–Turkey negotiations in detailand find answers to two research questions. Will Turkey and the European Union facea diplomatic failure? What are the potential short-term scenarios?

This paper compares the EU's accession negotiations with Bulgaria and Turkey to assess the conditions under which their negotiations unfolded and the role of bilateral issues in that aspect. To do so, the paper highlights the role of the member state vetoes and bilateral relations in the EU negotiations. It needs to be noted that even though the European Commission condemns the impact of bilateral problems on the accession process, unresolved bilateral issues, nonetheless, emerge as major factors complicating the EU's enlargement process, its effectiveness as well as the pace and nature of the negotiations with multiple applicants and candidates.

Rather than merely suspending accession negotiations in an attempt to keep up appearances, the EU should stand behind its core values and reset its relationship with the Republic of Turkey on a more credible and strategic footing, while pressing the regime on respect for human rights and working with civil society to keep the flame of 'deep' democracy alive.

This paper provides an in-depth model-based quantitative assessment of the potential impacts of a Turkish EU-membership for agricultural income and commodity markets, focusing in particular on the effects in Turkey. Results show that the main impacts on Turkish agriculture would be a reduction in subsidies, producer prices, and quantities produced. A decrease in agricultural income, especially for Turkish crop producers (except for tobacco farmers), is also projected. In contrast, producers of sheep meat, broilers and dairy milk would benefit from EU accession due to lower feed costs. Moreover, the demand levels of most commodities are projected to increase due to lower prices, thus Turkish consumers are expected to gain from an accession to the EU.