Pro-Kremlin disinformation: Books

Depuis la fin de la guerre froide et l’essor d’Internet et de médias planétaires, la militarisation de l’information par les États bouleverse l’ordre géopolitique. La guerre de l’information, qui oppose les États autoritaires aux régimes démocratiques, démultiplie les champs de bataille et fait de chaque citoyen un potentiel soldat. Plus que jamais, la puissance des États –qu’il s’agisse de leur hard power, leur soft power ou leur sharp power– dépend de leur capacité à mettre leurs moyens de communication au service de leur influence, en recourant à la cyberguerre, à la désinformation ou à l’instrumentalisation de théories du complot. À l’ère de l’intelligence artificielle et de la guerre cognitive, les médias sociaux sont le théâtre d’une « guerre du Net » sans merci, sans fin, dont nos esprits sont l’enjeu.

C'est l'histoire de la guerre secrète menée contre nos démocraties. C'est l'histoire d'élites corrompues qui se sont vendues à des puissances étrangères hostiles à nos principes et à nos intérêts. C'est l'histoire de la grande confrontation avec la Russie de Vladimir Poutine que nos dirigeants n'ont pas voulu voir venir mais à laquelle nous ne pouvons plus échapper. Je n'invoquerai pas dans ces pages la morale ou les grands principes, mais la sécurité et la souveraineté. Je n'appellerai pas à l'idéalisme, mais au réalisme. Oui, au réalisme. La guerre qui ébranle l'Europe n'a pas commencé le 24 février 2022 et ne se limite pas aux frontières de l'Ukraine. Elle dure depuis des années et, dans sa forme hybride, touche le cœur même de nos cités. Cette guerre nous vise, nous n'avons pas le droit de la perdre. Il est temps de le comprendre et de l'assumer.

In this book, Keir Giles explains how and why Russia pushes for more power and influence wherever it can reach, far beyond Ukraine – and what it means not just for governments, but for ordinary people. Bringing together stories from the military, politics, diplomacy, espionage, cyber power, organised crime and more, Giles describes how Moscow conducts its campaigns across the globe, and how nobody is too unimportant to be caught up in them. By lifting the lid on the daily struggle going on behind the scenes to protect governments, businesses, societies and people from Russian hostile activity, Russia's War On Everybody shows how Moscow's hostile intentions for the rest of the world are far broader and more ambitious, and the ways it tries to achieve them far more pervasive and damaging, than we realise.

This book examines the ways in which Russia and Belarus use disinformation, "weaponised" historical narratives, and the politics of memory for domestic and foreign policy purposes, utilising these factors to justify aggressive foreign policy in defensive terms and, domestically, for legitimating local ruling elites, consolidating the states' propaganda machines, and mobilising both societies around national power centres. Besides analysing Russian and Belarusian disinformation, geopolitical narratives, and policies, the book also assesses the effectiveness of these measures and discusses how the West can counteract the geopolitical narratives disseminated by Russia and Belarus that attempt to undermine Western democracies and weaken the resilience of its societies.

Transnational crime expert Mark Galeotti provides a comprehensive and ground-breaking survey of the new way of war. Ranging across the globe, Galeotti shows how today's conflicts are fought with everything from disinformation and espionage to crime and subversion, leading to instability within countries and a legitimacy crisis across the globe. But rather than suggest that we hope for a return to a bygone era of "stable" warfare, Galeotti details ways of surviving, adapting, and taking advantage of the opportunities presented by this new reality.

Some 400 years ago, in an era where reaching information was a struggle, Francis Bacon acknowledged that information is power. The quote holds a great truth : the access to information can help people to take better informed decisions. The problem we are facing today is choosing the right information, the relevant one and the truthful one. In security studies Hybrid War is not just a concept, it is a reality. The pandemic has shown that disinformation can play a major role in political decisions. These aspects are even more complicated if we look at the war in Ukraine. Layers upon layers of news, images, social media posts present a rather puzzling palimpsest, and all these contradicting images have an impact over the general perception of the televised war. The present volume gathers studies concerning the cross-border effects of disinformation, capturing the transnational effects and narratives concerning the war in Ukraine, but also a multidisciplinary view over the phenomenon.

Russia is waging wide-reaching information warfare with the West. A significant part of this war takes place on social media, which Russia employs to spread disinformation and to interfere with the internal politics of other countries. Drawing on a variety of primary and secondary sources, expert interviews, and fieldwork in Ukraine, the report describes Russia's information warfare in the social media sphere (as of 2019) and provides recommendations to better counter this evolving threat. Moscow views social media as a double-edged sword — anxious about its potential to undermine Russia's security but aware of its advantages as a weapon of asymmetric warfare. Russia's use of this weapon picked up most markedly in 2014, suggesting a reaction to the West's response to the Ukraine conflict.

Tyrants on Twitter is the first detailed analysis of how Chinese and Russian agents weaponize Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, and YouTube to subvert the liberal international order. In addition to examining the 2016 U.S. election, David L. Sloss explores Russia's use of foreign influence operations to threaten democracies in Europe, as well as China's use of social media and other digital tools to meddle in Western democracies and buttress autocratic rulers around the world.

Hybrid Warfare refers to a military strategy that blends conventional warfare, so-called ‘irregular warfare’ and cyber-attacks with other influencing methods, such as fake news, diplomacy and foreign political intervention. As Hybrid Warfare becomes increasingly commonplace, there is an imminent need for research bringing attention to how these challenges can be addressed in order to develop a comprehensive approach towards Hybrid Threats and Hybrid Warfare. This volume supports the development of such an approach by bringing together practitioners and scholarly perspectives on the topic and by covering the threats themselves, as well as the tools and means to counter them, together with a number of real-world case studies. The book covers numerous aspects of current Hybrid Warfare discourses including a discussion of the perspectives of key western actors such as NATO, the US and the EU; an analysis of Russia and China’s Hybrid Warfare capabilities; and the growing threat of cyberwarfare.

This book outlines the threats from information warfare faced by the West and analyses the ways it can defend itself. Existing on a spectrum from communication to indoctrination, information can be used to undermine trust, amplify emotional resonance, and reformulate identities. The West is currently experiencing an information war, and major setbacks have included: 'fake news'; disinformation campaigns; the manipulation of users of social media; the dissonance of hybrid warfare; and even accusations of 'state capture'. Nevertheless, the West has begun to comprehend the reality of what is happening, and it is now in a position defend itself. In this volume, scholars, information practitioners, and military professionals define this new war and analyse its shape, scope, and direction.

The Russian international media outlet Russia Today (RT) has been widely accused in the Western world of producing government propaganda and conspiracy theories. This book explores for the first time the role that conspiracy theories actually play in the network's broadcasts. More than this, it provides the first ever study of how the Russian government engages with conspiracy theories in the international arena, with a particular focus on the use of conspiracy theories as an instrument of public diplomacy. RT was established in 2005 to represent Russia to the world, and to present a Russian perspective on global events. Whilst some of RT's more overtly conspiratorial output has been taken off the air, the network remains a source of significant concern for governments and intelligence agencies in Europe and North America. Now, more than ever, policymakers, journalists, academics, and intelligence services alike seek to understand the role RT plays in the Russian government's foreign policy agenda.

Since the start of the Trump era, the United States and the Western world has finally begun to wake up to the threat of online warfare and the attacks from Russia. The question no one seems to be able to answer is: what can the West do about it? Central and Eastern European states, however, have been aware of the threat for years. Nina Jankowicz has advised these governments on the front lines of the information war. The lessons she learnt from that fight, and from her attempts to get US congress to act, make for essential reading. How to Lose the Information War takes the reader on a journey through five Western governments' responses to Russian information warfare tactics - all of which have failed.

This book explores the challenges that disinformation, fake news, and post-truth politics pose to democracy from a multidisciplinary perspective. The authors analyse and interpret how the use of technology and social media as well as the emergence of new political narratives has been progressively changing the information landscape, undermining some of the pillars of democracy. Part II of the book considers the phenomena of disinformation, fake news, and post-truth politics in the context of Russia, which emerges as a laboratory where the phases of creation and diffusion of fake news can be broken down and analyzed.

Peter Pomerantsev takes us to the front lines of the disinformation age—from Kiev to Manilla--where he meets Twitter revolutionaries and pop-up populists, “behavioral change” salesmen, Jihadi fanboys, Identitarians, truth cops, and many others. Forty years after his Ukranian dissident parents were pursued by the KGB, Pomerantsev finds the Kremlin re-emerging as a great propaganda power. His research takes him back to Russia — but the answers he finds there are not what he expected.

Technology is breaking politics - what can be done about it? Artificially intelligent "bot" accounts attack politicians and public figures on social media. Conspiracy theorists publish junk news sites to promote their outlandish beliefs. Campaigners create fake dating profiles to attract young voters. We live in a world of technologies that misdirect our attention, poison our political conversations, and jeopardize our democracies. With massive amounts of social media and public polling data, and in depth interviews with political consultants, bot writers, and journalists, Philip N. Howard offers ways to take these "lie machines" apart. Lie Machines is full of riveting behind the scenes stories from the world's biggest and most damagingly successful misinformation initiatives.

From Moscow, the world looks different. It is through understanding how Russia sees the world and its place in it that the West can best meet the Russian challenge. Russia and the West are like neighbors who never seem able to understand each other. A major reason, this book argues, is that Western leaders tend to think that Russia should act as a rational Western nation even though Russian leaders for centuries have thought and acted based on their country's much different history and traditions. Russia, through Western eyes, is unpredictable and irrational, when in fact its leaders from the czars to Putin almost always act in their own very predictable and rational ways. For Western leaders to try to engage with Russia without attempting to understand how Russians look at the world is a recipe for repeated disappointment and frequent crises. Keir Giles, a senior expert on Russia at Britain's prestigious Chatham House, describes how Russian leaders have used consistent doctrinal and strategic approaches to the rest of the world.

During the final three years of the Obama administration, Richard Stengel, the former editor of Time magazine and an Under Secretary of State, was on the front lines of the new global information war. At the time, he was the single person in government tasked with unpacking, disproving and combating both ISIS's messaging and Russian disinformation. Then, in 2016, as the presidential election unfolded, Stengel watched as Donald Trump used disinformation himself, weaponizing the grievances of Americans who felt overlooked. In fact, Stengel quickly came to see how all three players had used the same playbook: ISIS sought to make Islam great again; Putin tried to make Russia great again; and we all know about Trump. In a narrative that is by turns dramatic and eye-opening, Information Wars walks readers through of this often frustrating battle. Stengel moves through Russia and Ukraine, Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and introduces characters from Putin to Hillary Clinton, John Kerry and Mohamed bin Salman to show how disinformation is impacting our global society.

A wide variety of perspectives on the different uses of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in Russia and China and the impact this will have on the Global Order. Essays are from leading defense professionals, academics, think tanks, and policy developers. A comprehensive primer for those concerned with how emerging technologies will influence the west's near-peer competitors.

This study examined Russian-language content on social media and the broader propaganda threat posed to the region of former Soviet states that include Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, and, to a lesser extent, Moldova and Belarus. In addition to employing a state-funded multilingual television network, operating various Kremlin-supporting news websites, and working through several constellations of Russia-backed "civil society" organizations, Russia employs a sophisticated social media campaign that includes news tweets, nonattributed comments on web pages, troll and bot social media accounts, and fake hashtag and Twitter campaigns. Nowhere is this threat more tangible than in Ukraine, which has been an active propaganda battleground since the 2014 Ukrainian revolution.

By highlighting informational threats and giving them a military dimension, the authors of the Russian Federation's military doctrine have outlined the concept of information warfare. It is a kind of combat conducted by both conventional and indirect methods, open and concealed, using military and civilian structures. It has two dimensions: broader ("non-nuclear containment", i.e. combat waged on various levels - political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, military) and narrower (as an element supporting of action). An analysis of these issues enables us to identify several rising trends over the period 2000-2014 in Russian security policy. These boil down to a blurring of the boundaries between internal and external threats, introducing non-military methods and organisational structures to armed combat, and conferring an ideological character on this combat. This leads to a blurring of the contours of inter-state conflicts, which allows Russia to take part in armed conflicts in which it is not officially a party.