Pro-Kremlin disinformation: Council info and EU publications

The Council has approved conclusions on foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI). Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and its war propaganda have underlined the urgency of tackling foreign information manipulation and interference targeting not only Russian, but global audiences. The conclusions underline how foreign information manipulation and interference is often used as part of broader hybrid campaigns and aims at misleading, deceiving and destabilising democratic societies, by creating and exploiting cultural and societal frictions in a strategic and coordinated manner.

The Council emphasises that state actors and non-state actors also use information manipulation and other tactics to interfere in democratic processes and to mislead and deceive citizens. The Council reiterates the need to enhance the EU’s overall level of resilience to hybrid threats and campaigns, based on a whole-of-society and whole-of-government approach. The Council stresses the need to further develop in 2022 both the EU Hybrid Toolbox and the FIMI Toolbox, in line with the guidance given by the Strategic Compass.

Council conclusions on Special Report No 09/2021 from the European Court of Auditors, ‘Disinformation affecting the EU: tackled but not tamed’.

The Council adopted conclusions which call for further enhanced responses at EU level to counter hybrid threats, including disinformation, and strengthening resilience. The Council notes that new technologies and crises, such as the ongoing pandemic, offer opportunities for hostile actors to expand their interference activities. These pose an additional challenge for the member states and the EU institutions, besides the crisis itself.

As regards countering disinformation, the Council recalls the importance of the continued implementation of the Action Plan Against Disinformation. It underlines the need for sufficient resources for the three Stratcom Task Forces (East, Western Balkans, South) of the European External Action Service and invites the EEAS to assess the needs and possibilities for reinforcing its strategic communication work in other geographical areas, such as sub-Saharan Africa. The Commission and the EEAS are also urged to further develop, together with the member states, the Rapid Alert System towards a comprehensive platform for cooperation, coordination and information exchange for member states and EU institutions. As regards social media platforms, the Commission is invited to consider ways to further enhance the implementation of the Code of Practice on Disinformation, including possible enforcement mechanisms.

Further to the Presidency report and the contributions from the Commission and the High Representative on lessons learnt with regard to disinformation and securing free and fair elections, the European Council calls for sustained efforts to raise awareness, increase preparedness and strengthen the resilience of our democracies to disinformation.

The European Council adopted conclusions by which it called on the EU and Member States to strengthen their hybrid threat response capacities, including the cybersecurity, strategic communication, and counterintelligence domains. The European Council designated the European Commission and High Representative to fulfil this task and to report its implementation progress to the European Council.

The European Council adopted the conclusions wherein it again called for mobilising EU instruments to help counter hybrid threats.

The European Council stressed the need to challenge Russia's ongoing disinformation campaigns and invited the High Representative, in cooperation with Member States and EU institutions, to prepare by June an action plan on strategic communication. The establishment of a communication team is a first step in this regard.

The Council presidency and European Parliament negotiators have reached a provisional agreement on the main political elements of a new regulation on the transparency and targeting of political advertising. The regulation has been drawn up amid concerns about the dangers posed by information manipulation and foreign interference in elections. It aims to make it easy for citizens to recognise political advertisements, understand who is behind them and know whether they have received a targeted advertisement, so that they are better placed to make informed choices. It will support an open and fair political debate in member states, based on objective, transparent and pluralistic information, and ensure that political advertising takes place in full respect of fundamental rights, including the right to privacy.

The Horizontal Working Party on Enhancing Resilience and Countering Hybrid Threats focuses on:
- countering hybrid threats ;
- strengthening the resilience of states and societies to such threats;
- improving strategic communication and tackling disinformation.
The Working Party provides a horizontal overview of issues related to hybrid threats to support coherence and cooperation among the EU and its member states.

The Council has introduced further restrictive measures in response to Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified military aggression against Ukraine. By virtue of these measures, the EU did suspend the broadcasting activities of Sputnik’ and RT/Russia Today (RT English, RT UK, RT Germany, RT France, and RT Spanish) in the EU, or directed at the EU.

The East StratcomTask Force was set up to address Russia's ongoing disinformation campaigns. In March 2015, the European Council tasked the High Representative in cooperation with EU institutions and Member States to submit an action plan on strategic communication.
The East Stratcom Task Force (ESTF) raises awareness about pro-Kremlin disinformation, information manipulation and interference, exposing attacks on the EU, its Member States and EU’s Eastern Neighbourhood. It couples direct responses such as exposure and awareness raising with proactive communication and promotion of European Union policies towards the Eastern Neighbourhood. This is done through multiannual integrated communication campaigns such as ‘Moving Forward Together’ (Ukraine), ‘Stronger Together’ (Moldova) or ‘EU for Georgia’. In close cooperation with the European Commission and EU Delegations, ESTF works to ensure communication coherence and resilience against disinformation, including, where relevant, through partnership with and support to government strategic communication offices. ESTF also pays increased attention to strengthening the overall media environment in the Eastern Neighbourhood and contributes to the provision of appropriate and needs-calibrated support for independent media in the region.

Since 2015, the EU has significantly improved its capacity to tackle Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), protecting the EU’s democratic processes, security and citizens.

This first edition of the EEAS report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) threats is informed by the work of the European External Action Service’s (EEAS) Stratcom division in 2022. Based on a first sample of specific FIMI cases, it outlines how building on shared taxonomies and standards can fuel our collective understanding of the threat and help inform appropriate countermeasures in the short to the long term.

Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24th February 2022 considerably shaped the work of the EEAS in 2022 and the work done by the Strategic Communication, Task Forces and Information Analysis Division (SG.STRAT.2). The strategic and coordinated use of Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI), including disinformation, by the Kremlin to prepare and execute its war of aggression on European soil highlighted the harm that FIMI can cause, in particular when it is used as an instrument of war. Years-long information manipulation, disinformation and censorship pursued by the Kremlin inside Russia enabled and continues to fuel the war against Ukraine.

The EU Agency for Cybersecurity (ENISA) and the European External Action Service (EEAS) have joined forces to study and analyse the threat landscape concerning Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) and disinformation. A dedicated analytical framework is put forward, consistent with the ENISA Threat Landscape (ETL) methodology, with the aim of analysing both FIMI and cybersecurity aspects of disinformation.

To say that a lot has happened in 2022 is an understatement. Hovering above everything like a dark cloud is Russia’s unprovoked and unjustified war against Ukraine. This piece will give you a brief overview of the state of play of academic research on everything related to information manipulation, including disinformation.

The following article presents a selection of the myths and disinformation pushed by pro-Kremlin channels since the beginning of the Ukraine crisis. From its illegal annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014 and its ongoing military aggression against Ukraine, Russia has waged a sustained and coordinated state-controlled disinformation campaign targeting the Russian population, Russia’s neighbour countries, and the rest of the world, particularly aiming at influencing public opinion.

Foreign information manipulation and interference, including disinformation, has been identified by the EU as a serious threat to our security and democracy. The EEAS has a specific team to address these challenges which has just published a report on its activities in 2021.

During the first year of Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine, social media companies enabled the Kremlin to run a large-scale disinformation campaign targeting the European Union and its allies, reaching an aggregate audience of at least 165 million and generating at least 16 billion views. Preliminary analysis suggests that the reach and influence of Kremlin-backed accounts has grown further in the first half of 2023, driven in particular by the dismantling of Twitter’s safety standards.

"The COVID-19 pandemic and Russia’s war against Ukraine have shown how the manipulation of the information environment can impact on the EU and partners around the globe. Aimed at corroding trust in the EU and in the international rules-based order, foreign information manipulation and interference (FIMI) is also an increasingly important component in hybrid attacks. Building on the European Democracy Action Plan, the Commission has put in place a set of tangible measures and structures, including the revised Code of Practice on Disinformation, the Digital Services Act, and the proposal on transparency of political advertising currently in inter-institutional negotiations, to tackle information manipulation and disinformation. The result would be new obligations on platforms and for the first time a legally binding oversight framework. In addition, as announced by the Strategic Compass, in close cooperation with the Commission and the Member States, the EEAS is further developing the EU’s Toolbox to tackle Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI Toolbox), to boost a coordinated response to manipulative behaviour by foreign actors."

The Commission is tackling the spread of online disinformation and misinformation to ensure the protection of European values and democratic systems. Large-scale disinformation campaigns are a major challenge for Europe and require a coordinated response from EU countries, EU institutions, online platforms, news media and EU citizens.

The Commission announced the creation of six new anti-disinformation hubs that will become part of the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO), the independent platform for fact-checkers, academic researchers and other relevant stakeholders contributing to addressing disinformation in Europe. Now covering all EU countries, the new hubs will be operational from early next year and complement the current eight hubs already in place since 2021. They will contribute to the creation of a multidisciplinary community to create a network capable of detecting and analysing disinformation campaigns, organising media literacy activities at national or multinational level and other activities supporting the fight against disinformation.

Standing up to challenges to our democratic systems from rising extremism and perceived distance between people and politicians, the Action Plan sets out measures to promote free and fair elections, strengthen media freedom and counter disinformation.

This Action Plan answers the European Council’s call for measures to “protect the Union’s democratic systems and combat disinformation, including in the context of the upcoming European elections. It builds on existing Commission initiatives and the work of the East Strategic Communication Task Force of the European External Action Service. It sets out actions to be taken by the Commission and the High Representative, with the assistance of the European External Action Service, in cooperation with Member States and the European Parliament

Major online platforms, emerging and specialised platforms, players in the advertising industry, fact-checkers, research and civil society organisations delivered a strengthened Code of Practice on Disinformation following the Commission’s Guidance of May 2021

With the 2018 Code of Practice on Disinformation, the industry agreed for the first time worldwide and on a voluntary basis, to self-regulatory standards to fight disinformation. The 2018 Code of Practice aimed at achieving the objectives set out by the Commission's Communication presented in April 2018 by setting 21 commitments in different domains, from transparency in political advertising to demonetization of purveyors of disinformation.

The overarching study objective is to support the European Commission’s evaluation of the Code of Practice’s effectiveness. The assessment focuses on the 13 current Signatories of the Code of Practice on Disinformation (online platforms and business associations). The study analyses the standard terms of service and the specific policies and tools adopted by the online platforms to implement the commitments of the Code in the first year of implementation of the Code (October 2018 to October 2019).

Disinformation as defined in this Report includes all forms of false, inaccurate, or misleading information designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit. It does not cover issues arising from the creation and dissemination online of illegal content (notably defamation, hate speech, incitement to violence), which are subject to regulatory remedies under EU or national laws. Problems of disinformation are deeply intertwined with the development of digital media. They are driven by actors — state or non-state political actors, for-profit actors, media, citizens, individually or in groups — and by manipulative uses of communication infrastructures that have been harnessed to produce, circulate and amplify disinformation on a larger scale than previously.

MEPs warn of elected politicians and parties in Europe knowingly serving Moscow’s interests, undermining the EU’s unity and democracy. In a resolution adopted on Thursday with 433 votes in favour, 56 against and 18 abstentions, Parliament expresses its complete outrage and grave concern about the continuous efforts by Russia to undermine European democracy through various forms of interference and disinformation.
With the Kremlin attempting to sow divisions between European citizens, the text highlights how Moscow is recruiting some MEPs as “influence agents” and has created a dependent relationship with certain European political parties, including through funding, which then act as amplifiers of Russian propaganda and serve Russia’s interest.

This new report, prepared by the second Special Committee on Foreign Interference (ING2), follows up on the work of the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE), and makes recommendations to address institutional and normative gaps identified in the run-up to the 2024 European elections.

The mandate of the Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE) finished on 23 March 2022. INGE held over 50 hearings with more than 130 experts during the eighteen months of work. The final report of the Committee was adopted in the plenary on 9 March 2022. The day after, the European Parliament created a new Special Committee (ING2) vested with the responsibilities to follow-up on the INGE 1 report.

On 9 March 2022, Parliament’s plenary adopted its final proposals on how to strengthen the EU’s response to foreign interference into its democracy.

The EU’s lack of awareness and counter-measures makes interference an attractive tactic for malicious foreign actors and endangers democracy, say MEPs.

This is the mandate of the ING2 Committee

Parliament's research capacities within the Directorates-General for Parliamentary Research Services (EPRS), Internal Policies (IPOL) and External Policies (EXPO) have prepared a selection of publications and online resources in order to support the work of the new Special Committee on Foreign Interference in all Democratic Processes in the European Union, including Disinformation (INGE), ahead of its constitutive meeting.

Disinformation is a serious concern in organised societies. Social media and new technologies have increased the scale and speed with which false or misleading information can reach its audiences, whether intended and unintended. The EU action plan against disinformation was relevant at the time it was drawn up but incomplete. Even though its implementation is broadly on track and there is evidence of positive developments, it has not delivered all its intended results. We make recommendations to improve the coordination and accountability of EU actions against disinformation. We focus on the operational arrangements of the European External Action Service’s strategic communications division and its task forces. We recommend increasing Member States’ involvement in the rapid alert system and improving the monitoring and accountability of online platforms. We also point to the need for an EU media literacy strategy that includes combatting disinformation and taking steps to enable the European Digital Media Monitoring Observatory achieve its ambitious objectives.

Disinformation is a serious and increasing problem across the EU. In 2018, the EU issued an action plan to combat disinformation. This plan was relevant at the time it was first drawn up, but it is incomplete. Its implementation is broadly on track, but it is still being outpaced by emerging threats. This is the conclusion of a special report published by the European Court of Auditors (ECA). The auditors found that more coordination is needed at EU level, and that Member States need to step up their involvement, for instance in the rapid alert system. There is also a need to improve the monitoring and accountability of online platforms, and to include disinformation in a coherent EU media-literacy strategy, a strategy which is currently lacking.