EU - NATO cooperation: COUNCIL AND EU INSTITUTIONS

The Council reiterates that the EU’s strategic partnership with NATO underpinned by the strong transatlantic bond is essential for Euro-Atlantic security and stability. The EU remains fully committed to further strengthening, deepening, and expanding this mutually beneficial partnership, through political dialogue and cooperation in the framework of the three Joint Declarations of 2016, 2018, and 2023, and in full respect of the guiding principles of EU-NATO cooperation.
With a view to taking the EU-NATO partnership to the next level, the conclusions stress the need to develop and adopt a new, comprehensive, and forward-looking implementation document encompassing the full spectrum of EU-NATO cooperation before the end of 2024.

See the part of the conclusions on strengthening security and defence. EU leaders are committed to taking more responsibility for the EU's own security and, in the field of defence, pursuing a strategic course of action and increasing the EU's capacity to act autonomously. Strengthening the industrial and technological base of the European defence sector is of key importance in this respect, as is the transatlantic bond in the EU’s Strategic Compass and NATO’s Strategic Concept. Citing previous Council conclusions, the Versailles declaration, the Strategic Compass and the joint communication on defence investment gaps as guidelines, EU leaders called for the work to be accelerated.

The transatlantic relationship and EU-NATO cooperation, in full respect of the principles set out in the Treaties and those agreed by the European Council, including the principles of inclusiveness, reciprocity and decision-making autonomy of the EU, are key to our overall security. A stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains the foundation of collective defence for its members.

The transatlantic relationship and EU-NATO cooperation are key to our overall security. A stronger and more capable EU in the field of security and defence will contribute positively to global and transatlantic security and is complementary to NATO, which remains, for those States that are members of it, the foundation of their collective defence. The European Council supports the strengthening of the EU-NATO strategic partnership and looks forward to the third joint declaration on EU-NATO cooperation. It should be prepared in an inclusive manner, address new threats and challenges and include, as areas for enhanced cooperation, resilience, cyber and hybrid threats, climate change and security, space, and emerging and disruptive technologies.

In view of the forthcoming fifth anniversary of the signature of the Warsaw Joint Declaration, the Council encourages further work towards implementation within the agreed framework of the two Joint Declarations and the common set of 74 proposals in close cooperation with and the full involvement of all Member States. In particular, the Council calls for swift progress towards an ambitious implementation of the new Parallel and Coordinated Exercises plan. It reiterates the need for an effective operational cooperation in common areas of deployment, in particular between NATO Maritime Command (MARCOM) and EUNAVFOR Irini, calling for the conclusion of an administrative arrangement, building on the framework achieved for Operation Sophia.

[The Council] Welcomes the significant progress achieved on EU-NATO cooperation since the signature of the 2016 Warsaw and 2018 Brussels Joint Declarations, as documented in the fifth progress report submitted jointly by the High Representative/Vice-President/Head of the European Defence Agency and the Secretary General of NATO on the implementation of the common set of proposals. The Council reiterates the importance of enhanced, mutually-reinforcing and beneficial strategic EU-NATO partnership in areas of shared interest, including with regard to key horizontal issues such as the unimpeded exchange of unclassified and classified information, in an inclusive and non-discriminatory manner, with the overall objective of building a genuine organisation-to- organisation relationship.

Council conclusions on the third progress report on the implementation of the common set of proposals endorsed by the EU and NATO Councils on 6 December 2016 and 5 December 2017

EU leaders welcomed the launch of the permanent structured cooperation (PESCO) on defence. They stressed the importance of quickly implementing the first joint projects.
"For many years, the strongest argument against PESCO had been the fear that it would lead to the weakening of NATO. But it is quite the opposite. Strong European defence naturally strengthens NATO. This is why PESCO is not only good news for us, but it is also good news for our allies. And bad news for our enemies." -- President Tusk's remarks at the event on PESCO

Council conclusions on the Implementation of the Joint Declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
In line with its Conclusions of 6 December 2016 and of 19 June 2017, the Council welcomes the continued close and mutually reinforcing co-operation with NATO in areas of shared interest, both strategically and operationally, in crisis management in support of international peace and security as well as on defence capability development where requirements overlap.

The Council recalls the European Council Conclusions of 28 June 2016 calling for further enhancement of the EU-NATO
relationship by working with and for the benefit of all Member States, in light of those aims and values which we hold in common
and given the unprecedented challenges facing both organizations.

EU Heads of State or Government in the European Council called for 'further enhancement of the relationship in light of our common aims and values' in the form of 'accelerated practical cooperation':
"EU-NATO cooperation was discussed in the presence of the NATO Secretary General. The European Council called for further enhancement of the relationship, in light of our common aims and values and given unprecedented challenges from the South and East. This new ambition should take the form of accelerated practical cooperation in selected areas. The new impetus in EU-NATO cooperation will take place in the spirit of full openness and in full respect of the decision-making autonomy and procedures of both organisations, be based on the principle of inclusiveness and be without prejudice to the specific character of the security and defence policy of any Member State. The President of the European Council and the President of the European Commission will issue a declaration together with the NATO Secretary General in Warsaw in July".

EU-NATO cooperation constitutes an integral pillar of the EU’s work on European security and defence. The strategic partnership between the two organisations fosters the transatlantic bond, while EU defence initiatives enhance the European contribution
to transatlantic burden-sharing. A stronger EU and a stronger NATO are mutually reinforcing. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and the long-lasting effects it will have on the European security order, has brought the EU and NATO closer than ever. The EU and NATO have shown strong transatlantic unity in the face of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The security of the EU and NATO are inter-connected. By working together, they can make the best use of resources and of respective toolboxes to address challenges and enhance the security of their citizens.

In the first year after the adoption of the Strategic Compass, we have made significant progress, in full coherence with the EU Security Union Strategy of 2020. We have increased the speed, flexibility and responsiveness of our missions and operations to act. Our engagements worldwide, including the newly established missions, are a clear proof of our unity and our contribution to international peace and security. We have strengthened our ability to anticipate threats, secure our access to strategic domains and protect our citizens. Member States have also stepped up defence spending and investments in an unprecedented manner. We are further developing incentive to cooperate even more, in particular through joint procurement. We are now spending more, but we need to make sure to invest better. In parallel, we are strengthening our partnerships to achieve common goals in security and defence. These are an essential instrument to support our ambition to be a global strategic player.

The Strategic Compass was adopted in March 2022, one month after the start of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine. It lists more than 80 concrete actions to translate even more the EU's ambition in security and defence into reality. One year after its adoption, the EU and its Member States have made significant progress in its implementation.

Around 4,000 EU military and civilian staff are currently deployed in CSDP missions and operations in three continents, working for a more stable world and contributing to a safer Europe.

The return of war in Europe, with Russia’s unjustified and unprovoked aggression against Ukraine, as well as major geopolitical shifts are challenging our ability to promote our vision and defend our interests. We live in an era of strategic competition and complex security threats. We see conflicts, military build-ups and aggressions, and sources of instability increasing in our neighbourhood and beyond, leading to severe humanitarian suffering and displacement. Hybrid threats grow both in frequency and impact. Interdependence is increasingly conflictual and soft power weaponised: vaccines, data and technology standards are all instruments of political competition. Access to the high seas, outer space and the digital sphere is increasingly contested. We are facing increasing attempts of economic and energy coercion.

This first edition of the EEAS report on Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) threats is informed by the work of the European External Action Service’s (EEAS) Stratcom division in 2022. Based on a first sample of specific FIMI cases, it outlines how building on shared taxonomies and standards can fuel our collective understanding of the threat and help inform appropriate countermeasures in the short to the long term.

On 10 February 2016, the European Union and NATO signed a Technical Arrangement between the NATO Computer Incident Response Capability (NCIRC) and the Computer Emergency Response Team – European Union (CERT-EU).

The ‘Agreed Framework’, facilitated NATO support for EU crisis management operations by means of sharing assets, operational planning and command. It also included the security of information.

[The European Parliament]
13. Reiterates the need for the Member States to make collective and well-coordinated investments in defence and calls for the full and swift implementation of the Strategic Compass, integrating the lessons learnt from Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, with the objective of achieving a genuine European Defence Union that is interoperable and complementary with the NATO alliance and can act independently when needed;
14. Highlights, in particular, the need to engage further with NATO on the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Capacity and urges the Member States to ensure that the Military Planning and Conduct Capability is fully operational by 2025; strongly encourages the VP/HR to propose a Council decision on an EU Rapid Deployment Capacity to protect the Union’s values and serve the interests of the Union as a whole, to respond to imminent threats and to react rapidly to a crisis situation outside the Union, including in non- permissive environments and during all stages of a conflict cycle; underlines that the EU Rapid Deployment Capacity should be set up as a force that is permanently available and trains together with the goal of becoming a standing force;
39. Notes the necessity of ensuring unity, coherence and complementarity of efforts between the EU and NATO in upholding international peace and security; underlines that NATO remains the cornerstone of European security and calls for cooperation between NATO and the EU to be enhanced further while strengthening the European pillar within NATO, inter alia by consistently meeting NATO’s defence spending benchmark of 2 % of gross domestic product; calls for greater cooperation with NATO on fighting disinformation and hybrid threats originating from third countries;

MEPs call on NATO allies to honour their commitment to Ukraine and pave the way for Kyiv to be invited to join the defence alliance.

On 25 April, a Public Hearing on EU-NATO cooperation will take place in the framework of a SEDE ordinary meeting. The Hearing will focus on the follow-up of the Madrid Summit, where Members have set new strategic directions for the Alliance and reinforced NATO's deterrent posture on the eastern flank and sent a strong message to Russia about its unity in the face of aggression against Ukraine.

European Parliament resolution of 7 July 2021 on EU-NATO cooperation in the context of transatlantic relations

The EU and NATO have stepped up their cooperation with the launch of the EU-NATO Task Force on resilience of critical infrastructure on 16 March 2023. The EU-NATO Task Force has now presented EU-NATO Task Force on the resilience of critical infrastructure: Final assessment report, which maps out the current security challenges and identifies four key sectors of cross-cutting importance: energy, transport, digital infrastructure and space. The report presents targeted recommendations to strengthen the resilience of critical infrastructure.
The report presents concrete recommendations on actions that could contribute to strengthening the resilience of critical infrastructure, in support of EU Member States and NATO Allies

This in-depth analysis focuses on how to implement the Strategic Compass’s partnership dimension in the field of security and defence, and how to maximise the potential of the EU’s different strategic partnerships. The report not only provides an up-to-date overview of the most important security and defence partnerships, but also places them in their wider historical context, and in the context of future challenges within a fiercely changing geopolitical landscape. The report maps the EU’s different partnerships and their institutional arrangements, as well as the main policy fields in the realm of security and defence. It offers an in-depth analysis of the core challenges of each major partnership and charts out concrete recommendations for gearing each partnership towards a more impactful realisation of the Strategic Compass’s goals.

Publication metadata
The 2022 Yearbook of European Security provides an overview of events in 2021 that were significant for European security. The book charts major developments in the EU’s external action and security and defence policy. Divided into region and issue-specific sections, this Yearbook contains entries on the EU’s multilateral efforts and work in security and defence, as well as specific geographical sections on North Africa and the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas. The section on security and defence provides comprehensive information about EU defence tools such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) initiative, and an overview of security issues such as space, cybersecurity, terrorism, border management, hybrid threats and more. To enrich the reading experience, the document contains references to key EU texts, various EUISS analytical publications, an index and informative infographics.

On 21 March 2022, the European Union's ministers of defence and foreign affairs adopted the Strategic Compass, with EU Heads of State and Government subsequently endorsing it on 24 March 2022. The Strategic Compass is an actionable framework for the EU's security and defence up until 2030. It sets out concrete actions and timelines, with 51 of the 81 deliverables listed in the document to be implemented by the end of 2022. Ahead of the European Council meeting on 15 December 2022, where the implementation of the Strategic Compass will be a central topic of discussion – based on a progress report by the High Representative – this in-depth analysis examines the status of implementation of the tangible deliverables in the Strategic Compass, as well as the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead. Following an introduction on recent developments in the area of EU defence, the analysis goes on to look at the 'act'; 'secure'; invest' and 'partner' chapters of the Strategic Compass individually.

The European Union relies on space for its economic sovereignty and security and defence. Without space-based capabilities, the EU could not enjoy any degree of strategic autonomy in security and defence. Since the adoption and endorsement of the Strategic Compass, space has only increased its relevance for the EU in the area of security and defence. Indeed, the Compass calls for a dedicated EU Strategy for Space and Defence. Yet space and defence is not a new avenue of policy for the EU and defence cooperation frameworks such as Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund already fund and advance space-relevant capability programmes.

This Chaillot Paper provides an in-depth analysis of European security and defence policy ahead of the adoption of the Strategic Compass in early 2022. It also offers numerous recommendations and policy considerations in support of the implementation phase of the Compass. To this end, the report combines the insights of eleven expert contributors and the results of a questionnaire sent by the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) to 120 individuals representing government-affiliated research institutions, institutions affiliated to international organisations, think tanks and universities. The Chaillot Paper is structured along four chapters. These mirror the four baskets associated with the Strategic Compass: crisis management, resilience, capabilities and partnerships. The analysis suggests that while the EU has come a long way in the security and defence domain, there is still progress to be made and specific considerations to be taken into account.

As Member States encounter increasingly complex security threats, momentum to push for EU initiatives to deliver on the Union's level of ambition in defence has emerged. A process aimed at bringing clarity, guidance and incentives to completing the common security and defence policy, the Strategic Compass is a first for the European Union. Announced by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her 2021 State of the European Union speech, a European Defence Summit is expected to take place in February 2022. It is envisaged that, following its much-anticipated presentation, EU leaders will endorse the Compass in March 2022. European Council President Charles Michel branded 2022 'the year of European defence'.

The EU and its Member States will find it increasingly difficult to sustain the rules-based order and the Union’s own economic prosperity without a sizeable and consistent investment in maritime power. The politics of the EU’s approach to maritime security is conditioned by questions of geographical priorities and how to balance ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ maritime risks. The Strategic Compass should set measurable targets that lead to a higher and more credible EU naval presence, and it may even instigate a shift in the way the EU thinks about maritime security more broadly.

Despite political and industrial divergences between EU member states, space will play an indispensable role in the Strategic Compass. Space is a strategic enabler that can enrich the EU’s approach to crisis management, resilience, capabilities and partnerships, and the Compass is an opportunity to upgrade the status of space and defense within the context of the EU’s broader space policy.

Despite the direction offered by the EU Global Strategy, there is as yet no common approach to how member state governments understand threats to the EU’s security. Under the new Strategic Compass initiative – designed to provide enhanced politico-strategic direction for EU security and defence – member state governments and institutions will conduct their own threat analysis as a first step in a 2-year process. This Brief examines how a clearer understanding of such threats can help the EU to achieve its level of ambition in this area.

This study on ‘EU preparedness and responses to Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) threats’ was requested by the European Parliament’s (EP) Subcommittee on Security and Defence (SEDE) in the context of, but not limited to, the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Building on reports and expert input, this study first provides an update of the current level of each of the C, B, R and N threat elements, including the type of actor from which such threats might stem. It furthermore takes stock of the existing preparedness and response mechanisms and matches these against the updated threat landscape to determine the current state of play of the EU’s response tools and its remaining gaps where improvement may be needed.

The 2021 Yearbook of European Security provides an overview of events in 2020 that were significant for European security and it charts major developments in the EU’s external action and security and defence policy. The 2021 Yearbook of European Security contains region-and issue-specific sections, timelines of key events, lists of core EU documents, excerpts of relevant EUISS publications and an index. This year, the book contains a specific section on the EU’s multilateral eforts and response to the Covid-19 pandemic. The health crisis also features prominently in the geographical sections of the book, together with visuals illustrating the impact of the crisis in specific countries and regions.

The 'Normandy Index', now in its third year, aims to measure the level of threats to peace, security and democracy around the world. It was presented for the first time on the occasion of the Normandy Peace Forum in June 2019, as a result of a partnership between the European Parliament and the Region of Normandy. The Index has been designed and prepared by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), in conjunction with and on the basis of data provided by the Institute for Economics and Peace. This paper sets out the findings of the 2021 exercise and explains how the Index can be used to compare peace – defined on the basis of a given country's performance against a range of predetermined threats – across countries and regions. It is complemented by 51 individual country case studies, derived from the Index.

Of all European defence initiatives launched since 2016, the European Defence Fund (EDF) is without doubt one of the most promising, if not the most promising. However, the EDF will not by itself solve all problems related to the fragmentation and therefore inefficiency of European defence procurement. Only the Member States can do so, working in good faith together with the Commission in deciding the EDF work programme and funding allocations. Doing this, it will be essential not to confuse the ends – the creation of a strong and competitive European Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) – the ways – inclusiveness through wide cross-border cooperation and the will to pursue strategic autonomy – and the means – the defence research projects funded by the EDF. Keeping the course between at times conflicting paths and ensuring the return on a meaningful but still modest investment (EUR 7.9 billion over seven years) will be the main EDF challenges in the years ahead.

“History is littered with mistaken predictions about the future of warfare”: taking this observation as its premise, this Chaillot Paper takes a novel approach to exploring how future conflicts might unfold. In contrast to traditional schools of conflict anticipation, which rely on science, history and deduction, it combines imagination with an analysis of past and present trends to paint a compelling picture of conflicts to come. This approach, which incorporates elements and tools drawn from science fiction and futuristic art and literature, also takes account of hitherto unknown factors and drivers of conflict - new technological developments, environmental changes, or ideologies yet to be born. The volume presents 15 fictionalised scenarios that imagine how future conflicts might occur.

This 'Chaillot paper' focuses on new EU initiatives in the defence domain – in particular the creation of the European Defence Fund – and on the Union’s evolving role and engagement in this sector. The paper seeks to address three specific questions: (i) how can economic and political factors be balanced in EU defence industrial policy?; (ii) what strategic considerations are driving forward defence innovation investments at the EU level?; and (iii) how can the Union’s institutions ensure that investments in defence innovation evolve into tangible capabilities for EU defence? Cautioning against an exclusively economic interpretation of why the EU should invest in the European defence industry, the paper argues that the political dimension of capability development should not be overlooked. It also analyses how the EU’s future defence investments should be seen in light of changes to the global defence market and shifting geopolitical trends.

The notion of European ‘strategic sovereignty’ is increasingly important in debates about the European Union. Given rapidly shifting global geopolitical and technology trends, and the seeming fragmentation of the multilateral order, the EU is being forced to confront its own position in international affairs. A number of concepts have been given life because of the deteriorating international scene including “European sovereignty”, “strategic autonomy”, “digital sovereignty”, “technological sovereignty” and “open strategic autonomy”. However defined, there is a need to move beyond concepts and focus on the nature of economic interdependence, multilateralism and strategic partnerships. This online workshop, requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, zoomed in on each of these elements with case studies that centre on semiconductors, the Iran nuclear deal and EU security and defence.

The focus of this work is to identify the necessary research priorities to support the EU’s digital strategic autonomy and thus digital sovereignty. In this introductory chapter, we (i) analyse how the terms ‘digital strategic autonomy’ and ‘digital sovereignty’ have been used and propose the definition used in this report, (ii) define the scope and target audience, and (iii) outline the structure of the report.

Today, the European Union can boast a degree of strategic autonomy in space. Projects such as Galileo have not only enhanced the EU’s economy, but they may confer on the Union the ability to amplify its Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy. While the EU continues to promote the safe, secure and sustainable use of space, it is also true that space is rapidly becoming a political arena that hangs over geopolitical competition on earth. Space is crucial for EU security and defence. Yet the EU is at a cross-roads and it needs to develop ways to ensure that it maintains its strategic autonomy in space. Without strategic autonomy in space, there can be no strategic autonomy on earth. There is a need for the Union to invest in its space presence, push the technological frontier in space, ensure that its ground- and space-based critical infrastructure is protected, ensure that its industrial supply chains are resilient and utilise new initiatives in security and defence to further enhance the EU’s ability to act autonomously.

OJ L 80, 27.3.2003, p. 36–38 - In force