EU - NATO cooperation: EU PUBLICATIONS

In her political guidelines presented on 18 July 2024, European Commission President-elect Ursula von der Leyen identified defence as a priority and a key sector in completing the single market. An important part of that effort will be building a 'European Defence Union'. To frame the new approach and to identify defence investment needs, von der Leyen committed that the new Commission would present a white paper on the future of European defence within the first 100 days of taking office. Subsequently, the Commissioners designated to take on the High Representative/Vice President portfolio (Kaja Kallas, Estonia) and the portfolio for Defence and Space (Andrius Kubilius, Lithuania) have been tasked with producing the paper. The white paper is expected to predominantly address defence sector capability issues, industrial competitiveness and investment needs. It should also frame the overall approach to EU defence integration, with the aim of strengthening the EU's ability to respond to threats, particularly in the context of Russia's continuing aggression in Ukraine, combined with evolving geopolitical challenges to the south and increased military capabilities of other global actors.

This in-depth analysis focuses on how to implement the Strategic Compass’s partnership dimension in the field of security and defence, and how to maximise the potential of the EU’s different strategic partnerships. The report not only provides an up-to-date overview of the most important security and defence partnerships, but also places them in their wider historical context, and in the context of future challenges within a fiercely changing geopolitical landscape. The report maps the EU’s different partnerships and their institutional arrangements, as well as the main policy fields in the realm of security and defence. It offers an in-depth analysis of the core challenges of each major partnership and charts out concrete recommendations for gearing each partnership towards a more impactful realisation of the Strategic Compass’s goals.

The 2022 Yearbook of European Security provides an overview of events in 2021 that were significant for European security. The book charts major developments in the EU’s external action and security and defence policy. Divided into region and issue-specific sections, this Yearbook contains entries on the EU’s multilateral efforts and work in security and defence, as well as specific geographical sections on North Africa and the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Europe and the Americas. The section on security and defence provides comprehensive information about EU defence tools such as the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) initiative, and an overview of security issues such as space, cybersecurity, terrorism, border management, hybrid threats and more. To enrich the reading experience, the document contains references to key EU texts, various EUISS analytical publications, an index and informative infographics.

This document presents the outcome of the revision of the Capability Development Plan (CDP). It reflects the changes in the EU’s strategic environment, political guidance provided by the Strategic Compass as well as lessons observed from the war in Ukraine.

On 21 March 2022, the European Union's ministers of defence and foreign affairs adopted the Strategic Compass, with EU Heads of State and Government subsequently endorsing it on 24 March 2022. The Strategic Compass is an actionable framework for the EU's security and defence up until 2030. It sets out concrete actions and timelines, with 51 of the 81 deliverables listed in the document to be implemented by the end of 2022. Ahead of the European Council meeting on 15 December 2022, where the implementation of the Strategic Compass will be a central topic of discussion – based on a progress report by the High Representative – this in-depth analysis examines the status of implementation of the tangible deliverables in the Strategic Compass, as well as the opportunities and challenges that lie ahead. Following an introduction on recent developments in the area of EU defence, the analysis goes on to look at the 'act'; 'secure'; invest' and 'partner' chapters of the Strategic Compass individually.

The European Union relies on space for its economic sovereignty and security and defence. Without space-based capabilities, the EU could not enjoy any degree of strategic autonomy in security and defence. Since the adoption and endorsement of the Strategic Compass, space has only increased its relevance for the EU in the area of security and defence. Indeed, the Compass calls for a dedicated EU Strategy for Space and Defence. Yet space and defence is not a new avenue of policy for the EU and defence cooperation frameworks such as Permanent Structured Cooperation and the European Defence Fund already fund and advance space-relevant capability programmes.

This Chaillot Paper provides an in-depth analysis of European security and defence policy ahead of the adoption of the Strategic Compass in early 2022. It also offers numerous recommendations and policy considerations in support of the implementation phase of the Compass. To this end, the report combines the insights of eleven expert contributors and the results of a questionnaire sent by the EU Institute for Security Studies (EUISS) to 120 individuals representing government-affiliated research institutions, institutions affiliated to international organisations, think tanks and universities. The Chaillot Paper is structured along four chapters. These mirror the four baskets associated with the Strategic Compass: crisis management, resilience, capabilities and partnerships. The analysis suggests that while the EU has come a long way in the security and defence domain, there is still progress to be made and specific considerations to be taken into account.

As Member States encounter increasingly complex security threats, momentum to push for EU initiatives to deliver on the Union's level of ambition in defence has emerged. A process aimed at bringing clarity, guidance and incentives to completing the common security and defence policy, the Strategic Compass is a first for the European Union. Announced by Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in her 2021 State of the European Union speech, a European Defence Summit is expected to take place in February 2022. It is envisaged that, following its much-anticipated presentation, EU leaders will endorse the Compass in March 2022. European Council President Charles Michel branded 2022 'the year of European defence'.

The EU and its Member States will find it increasingly difficult to sustain the rules-based order and the Union’s own economic prosperity without a sizeable and consistent investment in maritime power. The politics of the EU’s approach to maritime security is conditioned by questions of geographical priorities and how to balance ‘soft’ and ‘hard’ maritime risks. The Strategic Compass should set measurable targets that lead to a higher and more credible EU naval presence, and it may even instigate a shift in the way the EU thinks about maritime security more broadly.

Despite political and industrial divergences between EU member states, space will play an indispensable role in the Strategic Compass. Space is a strategic enabler that can enrich the EU’s approach to crisis management, resilience, capabilities and partnerships, and the Compass is an opportunity to upgrade the status of space and defense within the context of the EU’s broader space policy.

Despite the direction offered by the EU Global Strategy, there is as yet no common approach to how member state governments understand threats to the EU’s security. Under the new Strategic Compass initiative – designed to provide enhanced politico-strategic direction for EU security and defence – member state governments and institutions will conduct their own threat analysis as a first step in a 2-year process. This Brief examines how a clearer understanding of such threats can help the EU to achieve its level of ambition in this area.

The present document reflects the outcome of the 2023 long-term strand revision, referred to as “Strand B”. It identifies key future strategic environment factors, future capability areas’ requirements and technology fields that Member States need to focus on to support the development of defence and security capabilities in the timeframe of in the next 20 years or more.

Of all European defence initiatives launched since 2016, the European Defence Fund (EDF) is without doubt one of the most promising, if not the most promising. However, the EDF will not by itself solve all problems related to the fragmentation and therefore inefficiency of European defence procurement. Only the Member States can do so, working in good faith together with the Commission in deciding the EDF work programme and funding allocations. Doing this, it will be essential not to confuse the ends – the creation of a strong and competitive European Defence and Technological Industrial Base (EDTIB) – the ways – inclusiveness through wide cross-border cooperation and the will to pursue strategic autonomy – and the means – the defence research projects funded by the EDF. Keeping the course between at times conflicting paths and ensuring the return on a meaningful but still modest investment (EUR 7.9 billion over seven years) will be the main EDF challenges in the years ahead.

The notion of European ‘strategic sovereignty’ is increasingly important in debates about the European Union. Given rapidly shifting global geopolitical and technology trends, and the seeming fragmentation of the multilateral order, the EU is being forced to confront its own position in international affairs. A number of concepts have been given life because of the deteriorating international scene including “European sovereignty”, “strategic autonomy”, “digital sovereignty”, “technological sovereignty” and “open strategic autonomy”. However defined, there is a need to move beyond concepts and focus on the nature of economic interdependence, multilateralism and strategic partnerships. This online workshop, requested by the European Parliament’s Committee on Foreign Affairs, zoomed in on each of these elements with case studies that centre on semiconductors, the Iran nuclear deal and EU security and defence.

The focus of this work is to identify the necessary research priorities to support the EU’s digital strategic autonomy and thus digital sovereignty. In this introductory chapter, we (i) analyse how the terms ‘digital strategic autonomy’ and ‘digital sovereignty’ have been used and propose the definition used in this report, (ii) define the scope and target audience, and (iii) outline the structure of the report.

Today, the European Union can boast a degree of strategic autonomy in space. Projects such as Galileo have not only enhanced the EU’s economy, but they may confer on the Union the ability to amplify its Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common Security and Defence Policy. While the EU continues to promote the safe, secure and sustainable use of space, it is also true that space is rapidly becoming a political arena that hangs over geopolitical competition on earth. Space is crucial for EU security and defence. Yet the EU is at a cross-roads and it needs to develop ways to ensure that it maintains its strategic autonomy in space. Without strategic autonomy in space, there can be no strategic autonomy on earth. There is a need for the Union to invest in its space presence, push the technological frontier in space, ensure that its ground- and space-based critical infrastructure is protected, ensure that its industrial supply chains are resilient and utilise new initiatives in security and defence to further enhance the EU’s ability to act autonomously.

This 'Chaillot paper' focuses on new EU initiatives in the defence domain – in particular the creation of the European Defence Fund – and on the Union’s evolving role and engagement in this sector. The paper seeks to address three specific questions: (i) how can economic and political factors be balanced in EU defence industrial policy?; (ii) what strategic considerations are driving forward defence innovation investments at the EU level?; and (iii) how can the Union’s institutions ensure that investments in defence innovation evolve into tangible capabilities for EU defence? Cautioning against an exclusively economic interpretation of why the EU should invest in the European defence industry, the paper argues that the political dimension of capability development should not be overlooked. It also analyses how the EU’s future defence investments should be seen in light of changes to the global defence market and shifting geopolitical trends.