EU - NATO cooperation: Articles

The accession of Finland and Sweden to NATO, ending their neutrality, and the lacklustre performance of Russia's anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) assets in the Black Sea, exposing significant gaps in its A2/AD architecture, have afforded NATO an advantageous position in the Baltic Sea and allowed it to assume supposedly the most capable posture in the Baltic. But the confined and complex character of the Baltic means that both NATO and Russia will continue to face significant challenges. That said, the expanded access that Sweden and Finland provide diminishes Russia's capacity to deny NATO use of the Baltic Sea, while an expanded NATO enlarges its scope for blockade and sea denial vis-à-vis Russia. At the same time, the effective regionalisation of NATO that expansion has brought has introduced new and considerable planning challenges. Though the Alliance appears to have the upper hand, it is not going to have a cakewalk in the Baltic.

Häkkänen’s key tasks for EU defence:
- Wise investments to bolster defence capabilities
- Enhanced defence readiness and preparedness across Europe
- Deepening cooperation with NATO initiatives
- Integrating new technological innovators to bring cutting-edge solutions to defence
- Exploring and using new sources of financing to support EU initiatives

Sudden crises present a ‘stress test’ for democratic policymaking. Amidst global crises the capacity for swift decisions is becoming increasingly important but reacting to abrupt challenges also easily leads to violations of democratic norms, as recent studies on Covid-19 pandemic demonstrate. To advance our understanding of this pressing tension that thus far has been mainly approached via broad regime-level comparisons, this study examines formal and informal coordinative institutions that facilitate efficient and democratic policy response in crisis situations. Applying the core executive model, we focus on Finland’s decision to apply for NATO membership that unfolded rapidly after Russia attacked Ukraine. Through detailed process tracing analysis, we show how the country’s strongly entrenched doctrine of military non-alignment was overturned with broad cross-party consensus in under three months via intensive mediation involving all key actors and governing institutions.

Before joining NATO, Finland formed several bi-, tri- and minilateral defence cooperation partnerships with its neighbouring countries and major NATO member states. After NATO accession, the role of smaller defence cooperation formats has changed in Finland’s security and defence policy. As a NATO ally, why should Finland continue to promote these forms of defence cooperation, and what will their significance be in the future? This report approaches defence cooperation from the perspective of individual NATO member states, aiming to enhance our understanding of the motives behind such cooperation in France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Estonia, Norway and Sweden.

On 7 March 2024, Sweden joined NATO after almost two years waiting for Turkey’s and Hungary’s approval. Sweden’s difficulties joining NATO due to Turkish and Hungarian resistance and its ambivalent reactions to related pressure were symptomatic for the country’s cumbersome switch from its normative non-aligned foreign and security policy towards a more conventional hard security and collective defence policy. Along those lines, the country’s self- perception and role as an international actor has changed significantly within only two years. Sweden quickly adapted to its new role as a NATO member, prepared involvement in NATO operations, stepped up military support for Ukraine and increased military spending, strengthening its armed forces significantly. This matches Norway’s recent plans for enhancing its defence, facilitating even closer Nordic cooperation, especially in the High North.

With Finland and Sweden’s accession to NATO, the number of neutral or non-aligned states in the EU has been reduced to three: Austria, Ireland, and Malta. How did Finland and Sweden’s shifts come about? What do these shifting neutrality – alliance membership constellations mean for the concept of neutrality, and for Austria’s position as a neutral state? This paper first examines the Finnish and Swedish debates pertaining to their own respective shifts, with particular attention to the far-right parties in those countries. It argues three things: first, contrary to most commentary, both the Finnish and Swedish policy shifts were underpinned by identity considerations, identities that remain largely the same under NATO membership as under non-alignment. Second, the far right’s acceptance of NATO membership has been a mix of opportunism and broadly engrained views of Russia. Third, par ticularly in Sweden, neutrality has become seen as a thing of the past, and alliance membership as new and exciting, with possible implications for how neutrality is understood internationally. The paper then examines the state of the neutrality debate in Austria, with particular attention to the notion of neutrality as Austrian identity, the role of the FPÖ, and the potential risks for “neutral Austria” going forward.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the benefit of NATO’s collective defence agreement prompted Finland and Sweden to end decades of neutrality and non-aligned status and seek membership of the Alliance. On 18 May 2022 Sweden and Finland simultaneously handed in their official letters of application to join NATO. Turkey’s initial opposition was resolved with a trilateral memorandum agreed at the NATO summit in June 2022, paving the way for all 30 Allies to sign the required Accession Protocols. 28 of the 30 NATO members had ratified the protocols by the end of 2022.

Sweden joined NATO on March 7, 2024, enlarging the alliance to 32 members (see Figure 1). Amid heightened security concerns about Russia after its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, both Finland and Sweden applied to join NATO in May 2022 with the intention to accede to the alliance together. Finland joined on April 4, 2023, but Sweden’s accession was delayed by issues raised by Turkey (Türkiye) and Hungary. The Biden Administration and majorities in the House and Senate expressed support for NATO enlargement to both Finland and Sweden, viewing the addition of these two mature democracies with capable militaries as enhancing Euro-Atlantic security and advancing U.S. interests.

In addition to welcoming the benefits of Finland and Sweden’s accession, it is important to recognise that there are also risks, including to Baltic security. These are far outweighed by the benefits and can be managed; nonetheless, acknowledgement of risks is the first step towards their mitigation. They include: that complacency may develop if Finland and Sweden’s accession is thought to somehow solve security challenges in the Nordic-Baltic region; that the expected benefits of Finland and Sweden’s accession will not be fully realised if they do not vigorously commit to their new roles in a collective defence context; that the pull of Nordic identity may detract from Baltic security; that frictions and disconnects at command and control boundaries will be detrimental to regional security; and that loose notions about ‘strategic depth’ might weaken efforts by the Baltic states to build a deterrence by denial posture on the north-east flank.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 ruptured Europe's security constellation, leading to historically neutral Finland and Sweden to seek NATO memberships. While there is literature on how NATO influences country's security apparatus, the impact of NATO on smaller states' securitization capacity remains unclear. We undertake 1) a discourse analysis of Norway and Finland's three respective Arctic strategies, 2) a discourse analysis of two online Arctic newspapers 'High North News' and 'The Barents Observer', and 3) an analysis of the allocation of Finnish and Norwegian military spending from 2014-2022. We explore both countries as cases where one is a historic member of NATO and the other is not. Despite this, both states share similar structural security risks such as Russia's geographic proximity. We periodize securitizing dynamics related to the Arctic, matching it to changes in the Finnish and Norwegian military sectors. Given small states lack relative material capabilities, we argue there is a systematic deadlock in transforming securitizing moves into material action. However, as a NATO state, Norway exhibits a significantly higher level of participation in military maneuvers and additional securitizing behavior compared to Finland. By contrast, Finland relies more heavily on intense securitizing rhetoric without accompanying material actions.

Was bedeutet eine erfolgreiche Modernisierung der polnischen Streitkräfte für Europa und Deutschland?

On April 4, 2023, Finland acceded to NATO, enlarging the alliance to 31 members. Amid heightened security concerns about Russia after its February 2022 invasion of Ukraine, both Finland and Sweden applied to join NATO in May 2022 with the intention to accede to the alliance at the same time. Sweden’s accession has been delayed by concerns raised by Turkey (Türkiye) and Hungary. The Biden Administration and many Members of Congress support NATO enlargement to both Finland and Sweden, viewing the addition of these two mature democracies with advanced militaries as enhancing Euro- Atlantic security and serving U.S. interests.

Russia's war against Ukraine has suddenly made NATO membership for Finland and Sweden highly likely. It would end their long-standing postures of 'armed neutrality'. Their accession would constitute a major shift in European security. Properly managed, it could produce a net benefit. Both nations would be security providers, with highly capable forces. They would make significant contributions to burden-sharing among the allies and enhance NATO's ability to modernise its defence planning and capability development. Their membership would also bolster NATO deterrence by complicating Russian military planning in the geostrategically evolving Baltic Sea region. Dealing with Russia in that region, the Arctic and the High North would also become more central to NATO's strategy and posture.

La réélection de Donald Trump à la présidence américaine interroge profondément la nature du lien transatlantique. Si les garanties de sécurité de l’Organisation du traité de l’Atlantique nord (OTAN), article 5 et dissuasion nucléaire notamment, ne sont pour l’instant pas officiellement remises en cause ou amoindries, des projets de la nouvelle administration portent sur le désengagement de fonctions au sein de l’Alliance, en particulier le poste de SACEUR (Supreme Allied Commander Europe). Au-delà de la vie politique américaine, ces projets ayant été critiqués par les présidents des commissions de défense du Sénat et de la Chambre des représentants, des réflexions sont aussi en cours au sein du comité militaire de l’OTAN.

The perception that the US has turned its back on or is in the process of separating from Europe and continental defence and security is certainly understandable. Naturally, there is a focus on the noise of President Donald Trump’s rhetoric rather than the signal of his policy intentions. While there remains and will remain significant transatlanticism at nearly every level of government, Congress, and across the ecosystem of policy institutions and industry, there is a growing appreciation of the drivers of the president’s policies within these circles. In many ways, the Trump agenda towards NATO is a practical recognition of new realities, and more a long overdue re-balancing of the transatlantic relationship to reflect the administration’s geostrategic worldview and domestic priorities.

Ukraine’s unique capabilities in drone warfare have significantly contributed to halting the largest land invasion in Europe since 1945. Given the looming threat of escalation on its eastern flank, NATO allies have a problem: falling short in understanding Ukraine’s drone ecosystem risks abdicating the strategic momentum in drone warfare to Russia and its allies. Through primary interviews with military, government, and civilian actors, we argue that the core characteristics of this ecosystem represent lessons to be learned themselves. Unfolding across the categories of speed, scale, and urgency, we recommend to NATO allies three policy proposals stemming from our analysis...

The US’s military presence and nuclear umbrella have underpinned NATO’s deterrence against potential military threat since the foundation of the military bloc in 1949. However, under the second Donald Trump presidency, the US has emerged as a potential threat to NATO solidarity.
The US’s brief withdrawal of military and intelligence support for Ukraine in its self-defence war against Russia cast doubt among its European allies over its interest in the security of the continent. Mr Trump’s suggestion of linking the availability of US military support to the receiving NATO state’s defence spending level further threw questions about the US commitment to the mutual defence Article 5 of NATO’s treaty. Moreover, Mr Trump’s proclaimed interest in taking Greenland, an autonomous territory of a NATO member state, Denmark, under US control is another latent source of conflict within the bloc.

This article discusses the implications of multi-domain operations (MDO) on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO) future. By examining both the historical literature and the antecedents of MDO, the authors identify three salient areas to the successful future conduct of MDO. They also raise concerns regarding the potential challenge posed by MDO to individual NATO countries, the alliance system, as well as its broader competitive strategy. Finally, the article discusses the growing risks posed by emerging enabling technologies and highlights the necessity of comprehensive MDO strategic planning for the Alliance’s future security and effectiveness.

Over the past decade, the world has entered the third nuclear age. One of the most important characteristics of this new nuclear age is the rise of emerging and disruptive capabilities that could influence and have implications for the credibility of nuclear deterrence, next to renewed major power competition and an emerging nuclear multipolarity. These capabilities create both benefits and challenges for the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). This was recognised in the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance adopted at the 2022 Madrid Summit. This article reviews the existing literature on emerging and disruptive capabilities and discusses the implications of these capabilities for NATO as a nuclear alliance. As these capabilities will be further developed and deployed by both allies and potential adversaries, they are likely to prove a mixed blessing for the alliance as a whole.

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and war on Ukraine has led to upheaval in NATO’s discourse and practice. Taking a step back from the security debate, this article contends that the very process of responding to Russian aggression has led to the reimagining of NATO’s identity. While NATO tends to present change as continuity, this article’s mixed methods analysis illuminates how a trio of new and ambitious self-representations have risen to prominence within NATO’s post-Crimea discourse. NATO has anointed itself defender of the international rules-based order and purveyor of truth and facts amidst a world of disinformation, while pushing a resilience policy agenda that expands its authority into new domestic domains. Problematizing these shifts, the article warns that NATO’s new narrative ignores its own role in the problems it seeks to solve and thus risks undermining NATO efforts to rally global support for Ukraine.