EU - NATO cooperation: Articles

Has Vladimir Putin always stood against NATO’s eastward enlargement? Detractors claim that Moscow has invariably objected to the transatlantic organisation moving towards its borders. This article challenges the prevailing orthodoxy by demonstrating that at the turn of the century, the Russian head of state was quite comfortable with NATO ‘setting up shop’ in Eastern Europe. Drawing upon declassified US diplomatic cables and other historical sources, the presented material speaks to selective forgetfulness on the part of the Russian leadership. The first years of ‘Putinism’ were not marked by assertions that NATO’s eastward expansion complicated relations with the West. On the contrary, his public remarks suggested that Russia was not opposed to this process. Simply put, Putin’s own words at that time refute his present-day arguments and display of grievances.

This paper argues that, despite joint political declarations, NATO and the EU do not sufficiently cooperate in the cyber domain. The investigation not only explores the political reasons for this, but also suggests ways in which the two organizations can effectively cooperate while maintaining their respective political positions. The recommended strategy is to focus on technical cooperation and avoid pursuing ideologies for the benefit of both organizations and their respective Allies and Member States. The paper proposes ways to implement cooperation between NATO and the EU by focusing upon technical cyber capabilities that the two organizations can support for mutual benefit. Two key concepts proposed by the paper are the creation of a federation of structures/centers for cyber protection by the EU and NATO and the legal redefinition of the dual-use concept to allow the EU Commission to financially support military and civilian cybersecurity systems.
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Why has NATO taken long to adapt its deterrence strategy to Russian revisionism and extend its military presence to the eastern allies? This article traces how the alliance's Enhanced Forward Presence has evolved in Poland and the Baltic states to, in turn, examine the changing understandings of allied deterrence. Abstract Why has NATO taken so long in adapting its deterrence strategy to Russian revisionism and extending its military presence to the eastern allies? The setting up of NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) in Poland and the Baltic states offers a critical case for examining the changing understandings of allied deterrence in the post-post-Cold War era.

In their January 2023 Joint Declaration, the European Union (EU) and NATO have agreed to deepen cooperation on Emerging and Disruptive Technologies (EDTs). lthough the recent conflicts in Libya, Syria and Ukraine indicate that emerging technologies have not revolutionised warfare, few dispute that the ability to master technologies such as Artificial Intelligence (AI), cloud computing, robotics or quantum computing could provide strategic and operational advantages in future warfare.

Large-scale warfare returned to the European continent on 24 February 2022 when Russia launched its renewed and full-fledged attack on its neighbour Ukraine. Due to the war, the question of territorial defence has taken centre stage in European and Euro-Atlantic security debates once more, strongly affecting not only nation states but also the two most important institutional players in charge of European and Euro-Atlantic security and defence: the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Thus, this chapter aims to analyse and assess how NATO and the EU can meaningfully organise security and defence in a nascent European security order.

La guerra en Ucrania ha puesto de manifiesto la necesidad de recuperar las capacidades militares en Europa, perdidas en las décadas posteriores al final de la Guerra Fría. Las fuerzas armadas europeas han reducido temerariamente su tamaño, tanto en efectivos humanos como en equipamiento. Conscientes de la nueva realidad, los Gobiernos de la Unión Europea parecen ahora decididos a invertir los recursos necesarios para solventar esas carencias. Pero el tiempo apremia; la guerra en suelo europeo ya no es una posibilidad remota, sino una acuciante realidad.

Russia’s war of aggression on Ukraine launched on 24 February 2022 upended Europe’s security order. The invasion was a wake-up call that peace in the continent should not be taken for granted and a catalyst for change at European and transatlantic level. The EU adopted a long-term Strategic Compass for security and defense. NATO, no longer “braindead,” issued a new Strategic Concept for the coming decade and is expanding. While there is convergence in strategic outlooks, questions remain on how both organizations will cooperate and coordinate their actions, implement the investment, troops and capabilities’ goals set in each document as well as deal with countries such as China.

"Russia’s war on Ukraine has raised serious questions about European security, but it has also led to much greater transatlantic unity. This Policy Insights paper argues that the war on Ukraine has given rise to a new consensus among large parts of NATO and the EU to reinvest in collective security. Charting the progress made by both NATO and the EU, this paper looks at how transatlantic partners are addressing questions related to the so-called need to balance between Europe and the Indo-Pacific, EU strategic autonomy and the implementation of NATO’s Strategic Concept and the EU’s Strategic Compass, as well as the conclusions of the NATO Madrid Summit. It finds that there are several areas for enhanced EU-NATO cooperation, but issues pertaining to future US elections, defence industrial policy and NATO’s force posture could sorely undermine transatlantic unity."

The paper addresses the uncertain future developments of the EU-NATO cooperation, in the context of the release of the Third EU-NATO Joint Declaration in early 2022. The author suggests three scenarios – continuity, stagnation, expansion – to which the EU should be prepared to react.

One dimension of strategic autonomy has been firmly decided upon since the EU created its Common Security and Defence Policy in 1999: the projection of military force outside the borders of the EU. That is also the dimension that must, and can, be acted upon in the very short term.
‘Autonomy’ has been the objective of the European Union’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) from the start. “The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO”. This is the foundational text of the CSDP, adopted by the European Council meeting in Cologne in June 1999. In December of that same year, in Helsinki, the European Council translated it into a military level of ambition, the Headline Goal [established by Council Act]

The SARS-CoV-2 pandemic singlehandedly awakened the entire planet as to the shortcomings of essentially every dimension of life on earth. Geopolitically, 2021 has also been marked by the Afghanistan withdrawal crisis brought upon by the untimely fall of the city of Kabul. One of the most important takeaways for the EU in the wake of these events, was the reality that the union falls short when it comes to a comprehensive, common crisis management strategy, strategic autonomy, integrated and resilient logistics mechanisms and even political unity. The initial reaction of most EU member states at the inception of the pandemic was complete lockdown, including closing territorial borders and halting exports, especially food and medical supplies. Post Afghanistan, EU member states are continuing their work on the Strategic Compass, the EU strategic autonomy process goes on. The concept of EU strategic autonomy has very much been in fashion in EU circles, frequently used in political discourse, in academia and in the think tank world. Reports are written and official declarations made, but is Europe really ready for strategic autonomy, can EU decision makers construct real consensus in Brussels as to what strategic autonomy means for the union? If there is strategic autonomy, independent from whom and what kind of ramifications would this have for the current security architecture in Europe, especially for NATO. These are questions the present article is looking to analyse. Essentially, what does EU strategic autonomy mean for EU-NATO-US cooperation in an era of renewed great power competition?

The 2016-2017 common set of proposals has played a vital role in improving EU-NATO coordination and cooperation in the field of countering hybrid threats. However, multiple obstacles remain in place and there is still room for increased cooperation, both with regard to the existing set of cooperation topics as well as in exploring new potential. Furthermore, the structural limitations of EU-NATO cooperation also raise the question of whether other formats should be explored to strengthen international counter-hybrid cooperation.
Chapter 4 of the "Countering hybrid threats" Clingendael Report - October 2021

This brief offers a broad picture of what a division of tasks between NATO and the EU could possibly look like. It draws on an observation of long-term and more recent trends, and aims at feeding the debate about the future of the two main European security institutions and the way they can interlock better.

The study notes inter alia that: all the V4 members agree that the Russian threat is real and destabilisation has to be deterred by all means; Ukraine is a vital security partner; the V4 is united in seeing Western Balkan stability as a key priority. There are, however, differences in willingness to take responsibility for these processes. While Poland champions the Eastern strategic direction, Hungary fosters a more focused approach to the South.

Évoluant dans un nouvel environnement sécuritaire, l’UE et l’OTAN ont pris pleinement conscience de la nécessité d’une coopération interinstitutionnelle. C’est particulièrement le cas dans le cadre de la lutte contre le terrorisme, la piraterie maritime et les cyber-menaces. Ces menaces ont été identifiées dans les stratégies sécuritaires des deux organisations mais n’ont pas fait l’objet d’une identification dans un instrument commun. Historiquement, les deux organisations n’ont d’ailleurs pas forcément réagi de la même manière à ces menaces. Depuis, la nécessité de coopérer pour les deux organisations a été proclamée à maintes reprises dans des déclarations officielles, spécialement dans la déclaration conjointe UE-OTAN du 8 juillet 2016.

At the end of July, US Defence Secretary Mark Esper announced plans to withdraw approximately 12 000 US troops from Germany. Reactions in Berlin were varied. The main narrative is that of Germany being penalised and transatlantic ties being undermined. In anticipation of the US presidential election, the federal government is being guarded in its statements. The German federal states affected by the cuts have started lobbying to stop the plans. The political parties in Germany are divided in their views on the Trump administration’s decision, which is welcomed by almost half of German society. Regardless of the motives, the Pentagon’s plans show the trend in the restructuring of the US permanent military presence in Europe. US permanent forces in Europe could in future be cut further as the US is less and less engaged in the Middle East and Africa. The units being recalled from Germany will not be moved permanently to allies east of the Oder.

Improved military mobility has been identified as one of the flagships for EU-NATO cooperation. Both organisations have a vested interest in being able to rapidly move defence forces, equipment and supplies across Europe. The authors identify and map the relevant stakeholders in this essential field of cooperation. Subsequently, the way in which the EU and NATO have been working together so far, in general as well as in this specific area, is analysed. Will the issue of improving cross-border military movement prove to be the silver bullet for solving the EU-NATO cooperation conundrum?

The transatlantic relationship has always been central to security and defence policy. The complex—and often confused—interactions between the two sides of the Atlantic over European defence arrangements have demonstrated remarkable continuity—from the post-1945 discussions around the parallel formations of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (1949) and the European Defence Community (1950), to the first period of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) (1999-2014), and on to the current quest for strategic autonomy launched in 2016.